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5 
Issues and Recommendations 
A Paradigm Shift in the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy: From Transformation to Resilience 
The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
is thriving. To the great surprise of many observers, 
there has been a sharp increase in the conceptual and 
practical activity of the Common Security and Defense 
Policy (CSDP), which legally belongs to the CFSP. Issues 
ranging from the creation of the European Defence 
Fund, to cyber security and the implementation of 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO, for short) 
have seen major reform or proposals for reform. These 
activities demonstrate a level of integration that is 
supported by a “Multi-speed Europe” and that goes 
beyond the familiar old token politics. How can we 
explain this renaissance of a policy area that was 
assumed dead? What legal driving forces and political 
dynamics contribute to the revival?  
Externally, the illegal Russian annexation of the 
Crimea triggered the return of war and conflict to 
Europe for the first time since the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia. Simultaneously, the looming US with-
drawal from Europe, the UK’s exit from the EU, the 
threat of terrorism, the vulnerability of critical infra-
structure and the migration crisis are all forcing the 
EU to reorganise its internal and external security 
policy. They are increasing public pressure on Euro-
pean politics to make the EU’s currently ineffective 
foreign, security and defence policy more forceful. 
Internally, the EU still suffers from a legitimacy 
crisis. Nevertheless, opinion polls emphasise that EU 
citizens consider security issues to be very important 
and would like Europe to play a noticeably bigger 
part in them. In spring 2017, the European Parliament 
called upon the European Council to form “Coalitions 
of the Willing”. The Council of Ministers is supposed 
to become more efficient by gradually replacing una-
nimity with Qualified Majority Voting. The “Europe 
of security”, which, as Commission President Juncker 
put it, “protects, empowers and defends”, is receiving 
support, including from Emmanuel Macron in his 
speech given at the Sorbonne in late September 2017. 
The crisis discourse has been replaced by a new narra-
tive of Europe as opportunity and necessity. 
The new CFSP differs fundamentally from its pre-
decessor. Contrasting with previous fundamental 
strategy documents, the EU’s Global Strategy of June 
2016 indicates that the CFSP’s drive for transforma-
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6 
tion, which was still referenced in the Lisbon Treaty, 
ultimately cannot be realised for the foreseeable 
future. There will be limits to Europe’s ability to stabi-
lise and pacify its international surroundings. Instead, 
the EU’s new Global Strategy centres on the strategic 
concept of resilience. Resilience is generally under-
stood as “a capacity to resist and regenerate”, as well 
as be “crisis-proof”. The concept acknowledges that 
there are practical limits to the normative goal of ex-
ternal transformation as outlined in article 21 para-
graph 2 of the TEU. Resilience therefore aims to enable 
the EU both to maintain its existing values and norms 
and to pursue its own interests. 
Resilience needs to be built up in both the internal 
and the external dimensions. The rising Security and 
Defence Union will rest on three pillars: the Security 
Union, the Defence Union and EU-NATO cooperation. 
While functionally and regionally flexible, political 
power will nevertheless be concentrated and insti-
tutionalised within the CFSP. Typical interior policy 
areas such as cyber security, migration or antiterror-
ism are becoming fields of action for the CFSP. Simul-
taneously, foreign and security policy – which used 
to be purely political areas – are increasingly subject 
to legal reform and incorporation into the European 
legal community. This makes the European legal 
community itself more resilient when facing political 
actions by member states that are at odds with its 
fundamental norms and values. The ECJ is ever more 
active in supporting this process. A resilient legal com-
munity is the necessary precondition for repelling 
external threats. 
The so-called Bresso-Brok Report of February 2017 
provides very detailed descriptions of what further 
advances in integration are possible within the trea-
ties. Brexit even makes treaty revision feasible, as the 
Verhofstadt Report from July 2016 outlines. However, 
administrative reforms and project-related progress 
in integration are not sufficient in themselves to solve 
a problem that ultimately results from strategic dis-
agreements between member states. To avoid one-
sided political dynamics that run the risk of neglecting 
EU or national law, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court in its Lisbon verdict introduced the concept of 
“integration responsibility” for the European integra-
tion process. This encompasses the associated parlia-
mentary oversight of any further transfers of sover-
eignty rights, the creation of efficient European deci-
sion-making processes and the dynamic development 
of the EU Treaty, including foreign, security and 
defence policy. At least four areas require reform: 
1. A European Whitebook on Security and Defence 
should formulate European interests while acknowl-
edging the EU’s actual capacities. This would allow for 
strategic clarity while also increasing democratic con-
trol. Such clarity should also be reflected in the design 
and priorities of Title IV, Europe in the World, for the 
new Multiannual Financial Framework beginning in 
2021. In order to allow the European judicial area 
to work effectively in both its internal and external 
dimensions, Member States should substantially 
increase funds for Title IV. 
2. To build a resilient legal community, the offices 
of President of the Commission and High Representa-
tive of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Af-
fairs should be fused. Commission President Juncker’s 
proposal of merging the Commission and European 
Council Presidencies points in a similar direction. This 
integration into the Commission structures would 
comprise all CFSP agencies and all spheres of activity 
in foreign, security and defence policy. Simultaneously, 
the treaty would enshrine the ECJ’s role in foreign af-
fairs and CFSP issues. The ECJ’s decisions have already 
paved the way for this adjustment. 
3. Within the decision-making process, majority 
voting should replace unanimity. Alternatively, article 
20 of the TEU allows for enhanced cooperation among 
at least nine Member States. A stronger culture of con-
structive abstention could also increase efficiency. The 
highest priority should be given to asserting the inter-
ests of the legal community; any conduct that breaches 
the TEU should be more strongly sanctioned Beyond 
inclusive modes of intensified cooperation, it will also 
be necessary to consider forming a core group con-
sisting of the Euro Group, and, in subjects regarding 
Russia, Poland as well. Closer cooperation in arma-
ment procurement should be tied to a common arms-
export policy to avoid competitive distortion among 
EU states. 
4. The new CFSP should be under parliamentary 
oversight via the Conference of Parliamentary Com-
mittees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the Euro-
pean Union (COSAC). Cooperation should be based on 
the principles of consensus, exchange of information 
and consent. The Commission and Council should be 
obliged to take part in interparliamentary meetings. 
The participation of the European Parliament in mat-
ters of sanctions and trade embargos is strictly needed. 
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The Old Paradigm: Transformation 
 
In the past, the EU’s external actions and the CFSP 
were characterised by lofty and often delusional am-
bitions.1 Official texts, such as the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) of 2003 as well other strategy docu-
ments (including some on the EU neighbourhood 
policy), time and again asserted the EU’s ability to 
shape its political environment single-handedly and 
act within its European neighbourhood as a stabilis-
ing and transforming power. Never again was Europe 
to find itself in a situation such as the war in the 
former Yugoslavia, where it had been able neither to 
act independently nor even to formulate its interests. 
Another important objective was to enable Europe 
to protect its interests globally. In environmental, 
human-rights and Middle-East policy – to name just 
a few examples – it had become increasingly clear 
that EU and US interests, and especially their prior-
ities, differed. The CFSP, established in 1993 by the 
Maastricht Treaty, was meant to put the EU in a posi-
tion to defend its interests rigorously in both Euro-
pean and global politics. Academic debate is dominated 
by the theory that the CFSP structures are dysfunctional. 
Some warn of disintegration,2 since key decisions con-
tinue to require unanimity and since essential differ-
ences persist among member states on an appropriate 
role for the US in Europe, on Russia policy, and on 
migration policy. By contrast, politicians and political 
advisors have held onto the sacred idea of Europe’s 
capacity to act.3 Some prominent academics, such as 
Andrew Moravcsik, have even stated that the EU is 
already a superpower and will remain one for the 
next decades.4 
 
1 Until 2009 the CFSP was anchored in the EU’s pillar struc-
ture as its “second pillar”. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP 
has been formally defined under the heading “General Pro-
visions on the Union’s External Action Service and Specific 
Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy” in 
TEU arts 21 to 46.  
2 Douglas Webber, “How Likely Is It That the European 
Union Will Disintegrate? A Critical Analysis of Competing 
Theoretical Perspectives”, European Journal of International Rela-
tions 20, no. 2 (2014): 341–65. 
3 Mark Leonard, Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century (London, 
2005). 
4 Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe Is Still a Superpower, and It’s 
Going to Remain One for Decades to Come”, Foreign Policy, 13 
In other words, the EU’s Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy was not rendered defunct when the member 
states’ preferences diversified during the eastern en-
largement. On the contrary, it is thriving, particularly 
in “coalitions of the willing”. It was even developed 
further in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty and now encom-
passes all areas of foreign and security policy (TEU art 
24 para 1). Under article 42 paragraph 1 of the TEU, 
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an 
integral part of the CFSP, which can rely on its civilian 
and military capabilities throughout the entire crisis 
cycle, from crisis prevention to conflict aftercare. A 
large number of the EU’s external actions – such as EU 
accession negotiations, the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, foreign trade and development policy – are a 
shared competency and technically in the hand of the 
European Commission. For a long time, the EU was 
seen as a “non-imperial power” – to use former Com-
mission President Barroso’s words – which had set 
itself the target of transforming its international sur-
roundings. The view that the EU is a “transformative 
power” has been expressed in various ways, all founded 
on certain legal provisions in the Treaty and on indi-
vidual EU policies. 
The EU as a Normative and Imperial Power 
The first variant of the idea that the EU is a trans-
formative power was supplied by Ian Manners’ much-
quoted argument5 positing the EU as a “normative 
power” that is exceptionally attractive to other states. 
The unique circumstances of the EU’s creation after 
World War Two – meaning the states’ voluntary 
rapprochement and relinquishing of sovereignty – 
had a constitutive effect on its nature, values and 
 
April 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/13/europe-is-still-
a-superpower/ (accessed 30 May 2017). 
5 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe. A Contradiction 
in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 
235–58; Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Withmann, eds., Spe-
cial Issue on Normative Power Europe, Cooperation and Conflict 
48, no. 2 (2013). 
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8 
norms (see the Copenhagen Criteria)6 as well as their 
expansion. According to this conception, the CFSP is 
subject to no geographical restrictions, and is guided 
by the values of democracy, rule of law, universal 
validity and indivisibility of human rights, and other 
noble aims (see TEU art 21 para 1). The EU’s legal and 
political reality contains a series of proofs that re-
inforce this view. 
EU policies are tied to the EU’s self-conception as 
a soft power. They concentrate on human rights (the 
Council’s Working Party on Human Rights, COHOM), 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
disarmament (Council Working Parties CODUN and 
CONOP), arms export control (Council Working Party 
on Conventional Arms Control, COARM), counter-ter-
rorism (Council Working Party on Terrorism, COTER) 
and international law (Comité Juridique, COJUR). 
According to Manners, normative power describes an 
actor’s ability “to define what passes for ‘normal’ in 
world politics”.7 For him, this is the “greatest power 
of all”,8 since it sets a standard for the actions of all 
actors. The EU’s constitutional and political objectives 
(TEU art 3 para 5 and art 21 para 2, respectively) are 
correspondingly ambitious.9 Human rights are of 
 
6 European Council Copenhagen, 21–22 June 1993, Conclu-
sions of the Presidency, http://g7.europa.eu/en/european-council/ 
conclusions/pdf-1993-2003/PRESIDENCY-CONCLUSIONS_-
COPENHAGEN-EUROPEAN-COUNCIL_-21-AND-22-JUNE-1993/ 
(accessed 30 May 2017). 
7 Manners, “Normative Power Europe. A Contradiction in 
Terms?” (see note 5), 253. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Its objectives are to: “safeguard its values, fundamental 
interests, security, independence and integrity; consolidate 
and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
the principles of international law; preserve peace, prevent 
conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance 
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Char-
ter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with 
the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to 
external borders; foster the sustainable economic, social and 
environmental development of developing countries, with 
the primary aim of eradicating poverty; encourage the inte-
gration of all countries into the world economy, including 
through the progressive abolition of restrictions on inter-
national trade; help develop international measures to pre-
serve and improve the quality of the environment and the 
sustainable management of global natural resources, in order 
to ensure sustainable development; assist populations, coun-
tries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; 
and promote an international system based on stronger 
multilateral cooperation and good global governance”. 
central importance in its external actions.10 In June 
2012 member states agreed a human-rights strategy 
and an action plan to implement their objectives. 
The EU’s policy on respecting human rights has also 
become significant on an operational level through 
the insertion of human-rights clauses into its partner-
ship, cooperation and association agreements. In cases 
of serious human-rights violations, it can draw on the 
suspension clauses also contained in the new agree-
ments. In the EU’s accession policy, these high expec-
tations for respecting human rights and the principles 
of the rule of law and democracy are formulated in 
the Copenhagen Criteria. 
The creation of the post of High Representative for 
the CFSP – initially in the Amsterdam Treaty and then 
ultimately in the Lisbon Treaty – aimed to improve 
the EU’s ability to pursue its normative objectives. The 
High Representative wears two hats: that of Commis-
sioner for Foreign Affairs and that of Vice-President 
of the Commission. The High Representative exerts in-
fluence on the design of the CFSP by chairing all CFSP 
formats at all levels.11 As Commission Vice-President, 
the current High Representative Federica Mogherini 
(in office from 1 November 2014 to 31 October 2019) 
chairs the Foreign Council and the Council Working 
Party on Foreign Affairs. This, alongside her regular 
meetings with the Commissioners responsible for ex-
ternal affairs, allows her to coordinate the CFSP more 
closely with the other areas of EU external action to 
work towards the objectives embedded in the Treaty.12 
In practice, it is the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), with its more than 5,500 employees and 139 
delegations abroad, which implements the Treaty 
 
10 On a proposal from the High Representative, the Council 
can use qualified-majority voting to appoint an EU Special 
Envoy for specific political issues (TEU art 33). Over the years, 
a dozen such representatives have been deployed – not only 
for human rights, but also for Afghanistan, the African Union, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Georgia crisis and the southern 
Caucasus, etc.  
11 For the impact of the financial and debt crisis on EU for-
eign policy, see Ronja Kempin and Marco Overhaus, EU-Außen-
politik in Zeiten der Finanz- und Schuldenkrise, SWP-Studie 9/2013 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2013); Ronja 
Kempin and Marco Overhaus, “EU Foreign Policy in Times of 
the Financial and Debt Crisis”, European Foreign Affairs Review 
19, no. 4 (2014): 179–94. 
12 Marianne Riddervold, “(Not) in the Hands of the Member 
States: How the European Commission Influences EU Security 
and Defence Policies”, Journal of Common Market Studies 54, 
no. 2 (2016): 353–69. 
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9 
objectives.13 In 2016, it was allotted about 600 million 
euros from the EU general budget.14 The relevant 
external relations of the European Parliament (EP), 
European Central Bank (ECB) and many other agencies 
are also aimed at pursuing the normative objectives 
set out in the Treaty. 
The EU has also gained in confidence in international 
fora and organisations. Under article 15 paragraph 6 
of the TEU, the President of the European Council (EC) 
inter alia carries out the foreign representation of the 
EU in CFSP matters “on his level and in his capacity” – 
notwithstanding the High Representative’s powers. 
The EU particpates both in G7/G8 and G20 summits of 
heads of state and government (through the President 
of the European Council and the President of the Com-
mission) and in G7/8 foreign ministers’ meetings 
through the High Representative. EU member states 
make up half of the OSCE membership and provide at 
least two-thirds of the financial contributions. Politi-
cal dialogue is an important CFSP tool for influencing 
the behaviour and stance of partners through ex-
change of information and reinforcement. Dialogues 
with regional organisations, for instance with the 
African Union (AU) and ASEAN, have become particu-
larly significant. The basis for the political dialogues 
is defined in association, partnership or cooperation 
agreements, joint declarations or exchanges of letters. 
As a sui generis legal format, the EU fits quite 
naturally into international legal systems and derives 
some of its normative power and credibility from 
this.15 Under article 34 paragraph 2 of the TEU, in the 
United Nations Security Council “[EU] Member States 
which are also members of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council will concert and keep the other Member 
States and the High Representative fully informed”. 
Since 2011, the UN General Assembly has admitted 
the EU into its work structures under Resolution 
65/276 “Strengthening of the United Nations System: 
 
13 European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 
EUISS Yearbook of European Security. Policies, Instruments, Facts, 
Figures, Maps and Documents, 2016; European External Action 
Service, Annual Activity Report, 2015, https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
sites/eeas/files/annual_activity_report_2015_en.pdf (accessed 
29 June 2017). 
14 EU General Budget, Section 10, European External Action 
Service, L 51/2280, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/ 
General/2017/en/SEC10.pdf (accessed 30 May 2017). 
15 Sybille Scheipers and Daniela Sicurelli, “Normative Power 
Europe: A Credible Utopia?”, Journal of Common Market Studies 
45, no. 2 (2007): 435–57. 
Participation of the EU in the Work of the UN”.16 Under 
treaty provisions, it may use neither pressure nor co-
ercion to impose its interests in its external actions. 
Receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012, the EU saw its 
past contributions to peace highlighted, while also 
being set the task of shaping globalisation in the 
future. 
Another variant of the theory that the EU is a trans-
formative power derives from the thesis that it cannot 
be understood “without borrowing from the imperial 
model of governance”.17 The social scientists Herfried 
Münkler, Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande categorise the 
EU as a “cosmopolitan empire”, thus distinguishing 
it from earlier empires such as the British. What Beck 
and Grande mean is “a form of exercising power whose 
characteristic is to strive constantly to govern the non-
governed”.18 This seemingly contradictory interpreta-
tion emphasises the fact that the EU is ultimately a 
voluntary alliance of states that must be kept together 
by a strong centre. Its foreign and security policy is 
held together through formalised cooperation in 
a) the CFSP processes, b) the large member states’ close 
interaction and c) “coalitions of the willing” outside 
the CFSP processes. 
a) It is not the coercive power of a central authority but 
the obligation to promote the common objectives 
and refrain from doing anything that contravenes 
them that holds together the CFSP (TEU art 24 para 
3). The role of the High Representative is intended 
to safeguard this coherence in the EU’s external ac-
tions. For instance, in May 2014 the Council passed 
conclusions to that effect concerning the “compre-
hensive approach”19 to foreign, security, defence 
and development policy, so as to improve the coher-
ence rule enshrined in the Treaty and the concerted 
approach of EU institutions and member states to 
 
16 United Nations General Assembly, Participation of the Euro-
pean Union in the Work of the United Nations, A/RES/65/276 (New 
York, 3 May 2011), https://documentsddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ 
GEN/N10/529/10/PDF/N1052910.pdf (accessed 30 May 2017). 
17 Herfried Münkler, Imperien: Die Logik der Weltherrschaft – vom 
Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten (Hamburg, 2007), 254. 
18 Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa. Ge-
sellschaft und Politik in der Zweiten Moderne (Frankfurt, 2007), 89. 
19 On the “comprehensive approach”, see Ronja Kempin and 
Ronja Scheler, Vom “umfassenden” zum “integrierten Ansatz”, SWP-
Studie 8/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 
2016); Ronja Kempin and Ronja Scheler, Joining Forces: Necessa-
ry Steps for Developing the Comprehensive Approach, SWP Com-
ments 31/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 
2016). 
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10 
conflict settlement.20 With the 2016 Global Strategy, 
the comprehensive approach became the “integrat-
ed approach”. Its goal to increase the coherence of 
EU crisis management will be implemented through 
the new PRISM unit (Prevention of Conflicts, Rule of 
Law/Security Sector Reform, Integrated Approach, 
Stabilisation and Mediation), which is located with-
in the EEAS.21 
b) In keeping with the logic of empire, member states 
have at their disposal specific power capabilities and 
levels of commitment.22 At the centre of the power 
structure are Germany and France, which both par-
ticipate in all of the EU’s policy-specific regimes, 
whereas members such as Greece or the Baltic states 
are more norm takers in the EU. However, the states 
that form the inner core of the power structure also 
have to forfeit the most official sovereignty. Their 
central role gives Germany and France – and previ-
ously the UK as well – a particularly strong obliga-
tion to make a correspondingly large contribution 
to conflict-resolving measures. 
c) Indeed the large Member States successfully meet 
this responsibility. The crisis management in the 
Balkans, the initiative for the Kosovo-Serbia dia-
logue, the leadership in the EU+3 negotiations with 
Iran about the latter’s nuclear programme, and the 
Minsk Protocol all receive a high degree of political 
and material support from the central states.23 For 
Beck/Grande, the deliberate negation of violence is 
another constitutive trait of the European cosmo-
politan empire.24 The EU is an empire “by invita-
tion”, in which power is based on the voluntary rec-
ognition of and submission to the EU regulations. 
For instance, in the run-up to European Council 
summits, the German federal government worked 
 
20 EU Council, Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, 3312. Session, 12 May 
2014, 18, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/ 
docs/pressdata/DE/foraff/142824.pdf (accessed 30 May 2017). 
21 Tobias Pietz, Flexibilisierung und “Stabilisierungsaktionen”: 
EU-Krisenmanagement ein Jahr nach der Globalen Strategie, Policy 
Briefing (Berlin: Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze 
[ZIF], September 2017), 2. 
22 Münkler, Imperien (see note 17). 
23 Oliver Meier and Azadeh Zamirirad, Die Atomvereinbarung 
mit Iran: Folgen für regionale Sicherheit und Nichtverbreitung, SWP-
Aktuell 70/2015 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
August 2015); Susan Stewart, The Future of the Minsk Agreements: 
Press for Implementation and Support Sanctions, SWP Comments 
14/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 
2016); Annegret Bendiek and Ronja Kempin, Strengthening 
the Role of the EU-3, SWP Comments 39/2011 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2011). 
24 Beck and Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa (see note 18). 
towards ambitious objectives for developing the 
CSDP: alongside France in December 2013 and June 
2015, and alongside Poland in 2015. Using the “flex-
ible solidarity” formula, it has also tried to involve 
the Visegrád states in migration issues to convince 
them of the value of following rules. 
Moreover, the empire recognises no clear distinc-
tion between internal and external. Even “non-gov-
erned” states are bound to the rules using political 
and economic incentives. For example, the EU pays 
Turkey around 3 billion euros for humanitarian aid 
and refugee accommodation.25 Officially, the money is 
intended for aid organisations. However, a substantial 
proportion goes to the state itself. Turkey also con-
tinues to receive money for its potential accession to 
the EU. For comparison: the total earmarked for EU 
external relations in its 2016 budget (under heading 
IV Global Europe) was 8.2 billion euros,26 which in-
cludes inter alia the EU’s spending on humanitarian 
and development aid, on promoting the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and on pre-accession sup-
port. These resources correspond, as it were, to the 
logic of permanent enlargement. The open and vari-
able spatial structures (e.g. the Schengen area or the 
Economic and Monetary Union) and the semi-perme-
able borders of the imperial conception of power (e.g. 
the association and stabilisation process in Southeast 
Europe) also emphasise this. 
Criticism of transformative approaches 
Nevertheless, the EU’s transformative approach can be 
said to have largely failed.27 The EU has not managed 
to influence the European neighbourhood in matters 
 
25 Christian Geinitz, “EU zahlt Millionen an Flüchtlings-
hilfe an den türkischen Staat”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
26 June 2017, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/ 
wirtschaftspolitik/eu-fluechtlingshilfe-fliesst-tuerkischem-
staat-unter-erdogan-zu-15077071.html (accessed 22 August 
2017). 
26 European Commission, Multiannual Financial Framework 
2014–2020, 7, http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/multiannual-
financial-framework-2014-2020-and-eu-budget-2014-pbKV 
0413055/?CatalogCategoryID=mpgKABstFogAAAEjbIUY4e5K 
(accessed 30 May 2017). 
27 See Richard Youngs, “Is Hybrid Geopolitics the Next EU 
Foreign Policy Doctrine?”, LSE Blogs, 19 June 2017, http://blogs. 
lse.ac.uk/europpblog/category/authors/richard-youngs/ 
(accessed 19 September 2017); Richard Youngs, Europe in the 
New Middle East: Opportunity or Exclusion? (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2014). 
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of conflict settlement so as to effectively contain the 
negative consequences of the (in some cases disas-
trous) developments in African and Middle Eastern 
countries and thus prevent larger migrant flows.28 On 
the contrary, every day hundreds of migrants attempt 
the Mediterranean crossing to escape poverty and the 
lack of prospects in their home countries. Despite all 
the measures to realise EU objectives that have been 
implemented as part of fostering democracy and the 
rule of law, and despite the conditionality policies 
towards the European Neighbourhood states, the over-
all result of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
remains negative.29 There are various reasons why the 
EU’s transformative approach can only be partially 
implemented, including: 
1. The EU’s pursuit of a policy marked by norma-
tivity has always been associated with its genuine 
entitlement to power vis-à-vis other regional organi-
sation and economic blocs. However, a normative 
foreign policy contradicts the EU’s desire for more 
power since its member states’ genuine actions are 
driven by the primary needs of security and wealth 
maximisation.30 In other words: because all states 
have a say and each state has the right to object, the 
EU’s external actions and its CFSP are criticised for 
being barely more than the “lowest common denomi-
nator” of the states’ divergent interests. Seen from a 
realist’s standpoint, it is the responsibility of the EU to 
secure and extend its position in the international 
community. From the perspective of international 
law, however, the EU is not a sovereign actor and 
therefore cannot live up to its ideals. Full membership 
for the EU in the system of the law of nations is not yet 
in sight.31 Even the planned accession of the EU to the 
 
28 Tobias Schumacher, “Uncertainty at the EU’s Borders: 
Narratives of EU External Relations in the Revised European 
Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Borderlands”, 
European Security 24, no. 3 (2015): 381–401; Steven Blockmans, 
The Obsolescence of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Report 4 
(Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 
May 2017). 
29 See “Krisenlandschaften”. Konfliktkonstellationen und Problem-
komplexe internationaler Politik. Ausblick 2017, ed. Volker Perthes 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2017). 
30 Adrian Hyde-Price, “A ‘Tragic Actor’? A Realist Perspective 
on ‘Ethical Power Europe’”, International Affairs 84, no. 1 
(2008): 30; Andreas Dür and Hubert Zimmermann, “Introduc-
tion: The EU in International Trade Negotiations”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies 45, no. 4 (2007): 771–87. 
31 Frank Hoffmeister, “Outsider or Frontrunner? Recent 
Developments Under International and European Law on the 
Status of the European Union in International Organizations 
and Treaty Bodies”, CML Review 44 (2007): 41. 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is con-
troversial. 
2. The resources made available for the transfor-
mative approach under spending heading IV, Global 
Europe, are insufficient to satisfy the high hopes 
placed in the EU’s transformative power. For instance, 
15 billion euros have been earmarked for the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy’s 16 states for the period 
2014 to 2020, which is not nearly enough to realise 
the desired objectives. The practice of tying relations 
with the EU to economic and political conditionality 
has also been much weakened – if not before, then 
certainly by Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker’s statement that there would be no further 
EU enlargement during his period in office. To com-
pensate, a new EU instrument for capacity-building 
will support civilian and also military security actors. 
Its introduction was justified using the Comprehen-
sive Approach and the assumption that security and 
development are mutually dependent. In accordance 
with the July 2016 joint communication of the Com-
mission and the High Representative on “Elements for 
an EU-wide Strategic Framework to Support Security 
Sector Reform”,32 the plan is to provide capacity-
building for all institutions in charge of security and 
justice. 
3. The results of the CFSP/CDSP missions and opera-
tions are mixed at best.33 It is obvious that the EU can 
only take on crisis-management tasks with its member 
states’ capacities. The EU’s capacities consist of the 
capacities coordinated, procured and made available 
to it by its member states when the need arises. Addi-
tional costs incurred under the so-called Athena 
Mechanism, deployment-related additional expenses 
(both civilian and military) and hidden contributions 
– for example, the cost of the experts seconded to EU 
civilian missions and the maximum 700 soldiers in its 
military missions – are covered by each state. A frame-
work agreement concluded in March 2003 authorises 
the EU to draw on NATO assets and capacities in plan-
ning and implementing military operations (Berlin 
 
32 European Commission, Joint Communication to the Euro-
pean Parliament and the European Council, Elements for an 
EU-wide Strategic Framework to Support Security Sector Reform, 5 
July 2016, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri= 
CELEX:52016JC0031 (accessed 29 June 2017). 
33 See the reply of the German federal government to the 
parliamentary question put by MPs Doris Wagner et al on the 
development of the EU’s Joint Security and Defence Policy, 
Parliamentary Paper 18/9643, German federal parliament, 
18th legislative period, Berlin, 14 September 2016. 
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Plus Agreement).34 To date, two EU operations have 
made use of the agreement (Operation ALTHEA in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Operation EUNAVFOR 
MED Sophia in the Mediterranean). However, such 
cooperation remains highly dependent on the willing-
ness of NATO members (such as Turkey and the US) to 
pool resources. Firm plans for a permanent maritime 
association under the CSDP’s Permanent Structured 
Cooperation are nevertheless being considered. 
4. The primary purpose of the CSDP (TEU arts 42 to 
46) as an integral part of the CFSP is to provide the EU 
with an “operational capacity drawing on civilian and 
military assets”. However, this capacity may only be 
used for missions outside the EU and exclusively for 
peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening 
international security in accordance with the prin-
ciples of the UN Charter.35 The EU currently has a total 
of ten civilian missions with around 2,500 employees 
in ten different states in the extended Neighbourhood 
area,36 as well as six military operations with around 
2,400 soldiers in the Balkans, the southern Mediterra-
nean, Central African Republic, Gulf of Aden, Somalia 
and Mali.37 For the latter, the Council for the first time 
used the decision-making shortcut of article 28 of the 
TEU, handing over mission responsibility to the High 
Representative. In May 2015, the Council on Foreign 
Relations in its conclusions on the CSDP urged mem-
ber states and the EEAS to give more support for re-
cruiting and deploying personnel. In Germany, for 
instance, the deployment of civilian experts on CFSP/ 
CSDP missions is organised in cooperation with the 
Länder within the framework of the Working Group 
on International Policing Missions and the Centre for 
International Peace Operations (Zentrum für Inter-
nationale Friedenseinsätze, ZIF). However, there is no 
similar European institution. Furthermore, the CFSP 
budget only grants the very modest sum of 327 mil-
 
34 Berlin Plus Agreement, 17 March 2017, http://www. 
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin% 
20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf (accessed 30 May 2017). 
35 Since 2003 at least 30 civilian and military CSDP missions 
and operations have been carried out in Europe, Asia and 
Africa. On this subject, see EEAS, Military and Civilian Missions 
and Operations, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/ 
headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-
and-operations_en (acessed 29 June 2017). 
36 Thierry Tardy, Civilian CSDP: What Next?, EUISS Brief 32 
(Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies [EUISS], 
10 November 2016). 
37 See EEAS, Military and Civilian Missions and Operations 
(see note 35). 
lion euros for such missions in 2017.38 However, 
article 41 paragraph 2 of the TEU provides for an ex-
ception to the principle that CFSP measures are to be 
funded out of the EU budget when the spending is on 
measures related to the military or to defence policy; 
the Council’s Legal Service is of the view that financ-
ing capacity-building measures for partners is admis-
sible.39 Outside the CFSP budget, there are only very 
modest resources for financing the EU’s external 
actions: on the one hand, the instruments listed under 
heading IV (Global Europe) of the EU budget (8.2 bn in 
2016);40 on the other hand, the European Development 
Fund (EDF). New financial instruments – for capacity-
building or the defence fund as part of the Multi-
annual Financial Framework, for instance – are cur-
rently in the planning stage. 
5. There is also a risk that member states could 
instrumentalise the CFSP/CSDP for their own respec-
tive foreign-policy agendas. The fight against piracy 
around the Horn of Africa – where the EU is interven-
ing with its maritime operation EU NAVFOR Atalanta 
– is the only example of the EU being active independ-
ently and representing “the lowest common denomi-
nator” of the EU-27/28. In early November 2008, the 
EU-28 decided to send several battleships and soldiers 
to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia as part of 
Mission European Union Naval Force – Somalia (EU 
NAVFOR Somalia/Operation Atalanta) to replace the 
previous operation, NATO’s Allied Provider, which 
used ships from the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2. 
However, once the United Kingdom has left the EU 
(Brexit), this operation will presumably no longer be 
managed from Operation Headquarters in Northwood 
near London, where a security centre has been in-
stalled that serves as a shipping interlocutor in fight-
ing piracy around the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf 
of Aden. The Operation Commander of Mission Ata-
lanta is a British major-general. An official consensus 
 
38 European Commission, Report on Budgetary and Financial 
Management of the European Commission, Financial Year 2016, 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/documents/2016/ 
Report_on_budgetary_and_financial_management-2016_ 
en.pdf (accessed 30 May 2017). 
39 Harry Cooper, “EU Plans to Militarize Aid Pass Parliament 
Hurdle”, Politico, 13 July 2017, http://www.politico.eu/article/ 
eu-plans-to-militarize-aid-pass-parliament-hurdle/ (accessed 
27 July 2017); Markus Becker, “Friedensgelder fürs Militär”, 
Spiegel Online, 11 July 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ 
ausland/migration-eu-parlament-fuer-entwicklungshilfe-fuers-
militaer-a-1157165.html (accessed 27 July 2017). 
40 European Commission, Multiannual Financial Framework 
(see note 26), 7. 
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has emerged that the CFSP has developed into an 
instrument of a few select member states. Evidence 
can be found in the EU Global Strategy as well as in 
European Council decisions since 2016. Early on, some 
government officials advocated an informal division 
of labour between the EEAS and member states. The 
UK and Germany therefore launched an initiative on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the EEAS and Com-
mission, having been mandated by the Council, are 
now continuing. In Mali, it was France who initially 
intervened militarily, before the EU took over. How-
ever, this development could also be interpreted as 
showing that the CFSP is merely an extension of 
national foreign policy. 
6. The EU also looks rather weak when it comes to 
fighting hybrid threats. Hybrid threats are character-
ised by a mixture of coercion and infiltration and of 
conventional and unconventional methods by state 
and non-state actors, but without crossing the thresh-
old of an officially declared war. Although the EU’s 
political dialogues with third states were extended 
to include cybersecurity issues, they have ultimately 
remained unsuccessful. According to reports by the 
German security agency, the Federal Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution, Russia and China host 
so-called proxies – meaning private actors such as 
hackers – who carry out regular attacks on European 
government agencies and companies either on behalf 
of the government or with its tacit connivance. Con-
fidence and security-building measures have been 
initiated at the UN and OSCE levels; however, individ-
ual member states have conflicting concerns. More-
over, the EU commitment remains limited to the lowest 
common denominator. A catalogue of sanctions, 
the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, has also been commis-
sioned at the EU level. By contrast with the USA, the 
EU has not yet seriously considered imposing concrete 
sanctions against these countries over the continued 
cyber-attacks. To push through its political objectives, 
the EU has increasingly used restrictive measures, 
which tend to target the government officials of spe-
cific third states as well as national companies and 
other legal entities and natural persons. Here, the 
sanctions imposed independently by the EU (e.g. 
against the former Tunisian and Egyptian heads of 
state) must be differentiated from those it is or was 
obliged to impose because of a UN Security Council 
resolution (e.g. against Guinea-Bissau or the Iranian 
nuclear programme). Often the sanctions are hybrid, 
with the EU passing a resolution to apply existing 
UN sanctions and augment them by its own lists 
(e.g. North Korea or Syria).41 The efforts of the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC) against human-rights 
violations in the world have not been substantially 
driven by the EU. The ICC focuses on proceedings 
against defendants from African countries. However, 
its potential as one of the most important instruments 
of global governance has not been realised either in 
the EU’s Africa policy or in other regions.42 The reality 
of multilateral politics is sobering when set against 
the EU’s self-imposed normative exactingness con-
cerning external actions. 
The paltry overall results of the EU’s transformative 
foreign policy have contributed substantially to a stra-
tegic rethink of the CFSP. The operative words are now 
realism or “principled pragmatism” (as it is called in 
the EU Global Strategy), not utopianism or idealism.43 
All in all, the transformative narrative is little suited 
to the EU’s external actions. In fact, it should be 
stressed that there has not been a convincing expres-
sion of the EU’s normative or imperial power to date. 
 
 
 
41 An overview of the EU’s current sanctions regimes and 
a list of all persons and organisations whose bank accounts 
have been frozen can be found on the EEAS website at http:// 
eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf (accessed 
30 May 2017). 
42 On this point, see the seminal work by Denis M. Tull and 
Annette Weber, Afrika und der Internationale Strafgerichtshof. Vom 
Konflikt zur politischen Selbstbehauptung, SWP Studie 2/2016 (Ber-
lin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2016). 
43 European Union, Global Strategy: Shared Vision, Common 
Action – A Stronger Europe, 2016, http://www.iss.europa.eu/ 
uploads/media/EUGS.pdf (accessed 29 June 2017). 
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The New Paradigm: Resilience 
 
In late 2016, the EU adopted its new Global Strategy 
for Foreign and Security Policy, which redefined the 
normative framework of the CFSP. Under the motto 
“Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe”, 
its team of authors, centred on the then-deputy direc-
tor of the Italian policy consultants Istituto Affari 
Internazionali (IAI), Nathalie Tocci, declared that 
building up the EU’s resilience44 against internal and 
external threats was the overarching goal. The legally 
non-binding document replaces the 2003 European 
security strategy.45 The central analytical concept of 
resilience denotes the “ability to resist and regenerate” 
and to be “crisis-proof” in disasters and other challeng-
ing situations.46 The Global Strategy sets high stand-
ards for the resilience of member and neighbouring 
states: resilience encompasses the ability to defend 
against attacks and endure and repair damage, but 
also to build structures in which such attacks and 
damage cannot occur in the first place. According 
to the Commission, key elements include “fostering 
peace and guaranteeing the security of the EU and 
its citizens, since internal security depends on peace 
outside of the EU’s external borders.”47 Security for 
the EU begins internally. The new EU strategy inter-
prets resilience as a comprehensive concept of in-
ternal and external security that encompasses “all 
individuals and the whole of society”. From this per-
spective, a resilient society is democratic, based on 
institutional confidence and sustainable development. 
According to the Global Strategy, this requires an 
integrated approach that includes all relevant stake-
 
44 A very good introduction to the concept of resilience can 
be found in Henrik Brinkmann et al., Ökonomische Resilienz. 
Schlüsselbegriff für ein neues wirtschaftspolitisches Leitbild? (Berlin: 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, July 2017). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Sebastian Hanisch, Was ist Resilienz? Unschärfen eines Schlüs-
selbegriffs, Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik, 19/2016; on the 
sociological basis of the concept, see Ulrich Bröckling, Gute 
Hirten führen sanft – Über Menschenregierungskünste (Berlin, 2017). 
47 Mogherini’s presentation of the Global Strategy for 
the EU’s security architecture can be found here: https://ec. 
europa.eu/germany/news/mogherini-stellt-globale-strategie-
f%C3%BCr-die-eu-sicherheitsarchitektur-vor_de (accessed 
23 August 2017). 
holders and fittingly refers to “societal resilience”.48 
The new paradigm of resilience foregrounds a pro-
tective and conservative foreign and security policy. 
Some observers see it as a “counter-concept to trans-
formative approaches”,49 whilst others consider it a 
constructive proposal to overcome the contradiction 
between fostering stability and promoting democracy 
through external action in third states.50 This is quali-
tatively different from the EU’s previous, transforma-
tive goals. 
According to the Global Strategy, a resilient EU 
would have two main characteristics: the ability to 
avert external risks and dangers, and the capability to 
stabilise its neighbouring states. The expectation the 
Strategy expresses – of continuing to act transforma-
tively on its environment – has led to reproaches from 
experts that its concept of resilience is unclear. Accord-
ing to these critics, the Global Strategy often does not 
make plain who exactly is expected to show resili-
ence against what, in what context and with what 
resources.51 In fact, two different interpretations of 
the term emerge from the literature and documents, 
which can be juxtaposed as internal and external 
resilience. Both are equally important for under-
standing the new CFSP. 
 The external interpretation of resilience is based 
on a fundamental distinction between internal and 
 
48 In academic circles, this tends to be interpreted rather as 
civil security: see Emil J. Kirchner et al., “Civil Security in the 
EU: National Persistence versus EU Ambitions?”, European Secu-
rity 24, no. 2 (2015): 287–303; Christopher C. Leite, “Coopera-
tion in EU Disaster Response and Security Provision: Circu-
lating Practices”, European Security 24, no. 4 (2015): 560–78. 
49 For a critical perspective, see also Sven Biscop, A Strategy 
for Europe’s Neighbourhood: Keep Resilient and Carry On? (Madrid: 
Real Institute Elcano, 16 January 2017), http://www. real-
institutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_ 
GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari4-2017-
biscop-strategy-europe-neighbourhood-keep-resilient-carry-on 
(accessed 30 May 2017); Ana E. Juncos, “Resilience as the New 
EU Foreign Policy Paradigm: A Pragmatic Turn?”, European 
Security 26, no. 1 (2017): 1–18. 
50 See also the somewhat positive appraisal by Wolfgang 
Wagner and Rosanne Anholt, “Resilience as the EU Global 
Strategy’s New Leitmotif: Pragmatic, Problematic or Promis-
ing?”, Contemporary Security Policy 37, no. 3 (2016): 414–30. 
51 Ibid. 
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external policy. In this definition, resilience exclu-
sively refers to security-relevant challenges and the 
ability to withstand attacks, shocks and challenges 
from the outside. These include cyber-attacks on the 
critical infrastructure of member states or the EU, 
natural and environmental disasters, uncontrolled 
migration movements and terrorist attacks. 
 Where resilience is interpreted as internal, it re-
moves the separation between the EU’s internal and 
external policy, as well as between its security and 
other challenges for the EU or its legally binding 
legislative acts (acquis). Here, all actions by individ-
uals and institutions that run counter to the EU’s 
legal acquis are ultimately relevant for resilience. 
They include all breaches of European law by mem-
ber states or other legal entities as well as explicit 
attacks. Most recently, in July 2017, the European 
Commission threatened to initiate proceedings 
against Poland to withdraw its right of vote at the 
European level under TEU article 7. In the Commis-
sion’s view, if the Polish government were to put 
its controversial reform of the justice system into 
effect, its constitution would no longer conform to 
European legal standards for the independence of 
the judiciary. 
The Security and Defence Union 
Developing the EU’s resilience against internal and 
external challenges is based on close cooperation 
between legal and political initiatives. The vast politi-
cal energy invested since July 2016 in implementing 
the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS) can be explained by 
the perceived necessity to create resilience.52 It has 
created a security and defence union – as policy 
requires – under the responsibility of CFSP structures, 
particularly the EU High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the 
Commission, Federica Mogherini. The idea of a secu-
rity and defence union is not new, but in the past, it 
mainly referred to the external aspect of security. 
Today it combines internal and external security pol-
icies, such as the security and defence union and EU-
NATO cooperation. 
 
52 European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger 
Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy (see note 43); European Defence – A Year On from the 
Global Strategy, EP Briefing, July 2017. 
This has been an ongoing process for at least 15 
years. As long ago as 2002 the French and German 
foreign ministers, Joschka Fischer and Dominique de 
Villepin, announced in the then-European Convention 
that the ESDP was to be developed into a security and 
defence union.53 However, the Franco-German initia-
tive only gained momentum after the UK’s decision to 
leave the EU in June 2016. In its White Book on secu-
rity policy and the future of the German army, pub-
lished on 13 July 2016, the German federal govern-
ment also advocated the development of the CSDP 
into a “European security and defence union”. In No-
vember, German defence minister Ursula von der 
Leyen declared herself in favour of the long-term ob-
jective of establishing a European security and defence 
union.54 In November 2016 the Commission’s action 
plan on defence formulated the following priorities 
for achieving resilience, which first and foremost con-
cern the security of the EU’s citizens and territory:55 
a) reacting to crises and conflicts in the border regions 
of the EU, b) building capacities in neighbouring 
regions, and c) protecting the EU and its citizens. How-
ever, the original CSDP was not created for these pur-
poses. Federica Mogherini, the EU High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Jyrki 
Katainen, Vice-President of the European Commission 
responsible for employment, growth, investment and 
competitivity, support a deepening of security policy. 
In January 2017, they called for the EU to be built into 
a true defence union that was not limited to the EU-
2756 because the EU’s security could only be improved, 
they argued, through external measures and close co-
operation with NATO. There are no treaty provisions 
to that effect, but the political will certainly exists. 
 
53 European Convention, Joschka Fischer and Dominique de 
Villepin, Gemeinsame deutsch-französische Vorschläge für den Euro-
päischen Konvent zum Bereich Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidi-
gungspolitik, 22 November 2002. 
54 Ursula von der Leyen, “Die Europäer müssen mehr Ver-
antwortung übernehmen”, Der Tagesspiegel, 12 November 
2016, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/ursula-von-der-leyen-
die-europaeer-muessen-mehr-verantwortung-uebernehmen/ 
14834596.html (accessed 14 June 2017). 
55 For a fundamental exploration of this subject, see Vincenzo 
Pavone et al., “A Systemic Approach to Security: Beyond the 
Tradeoff between Security and Liberty”, Democracy & Security 
12, no. 4 (2016): 225–46. 
56 Federica Mogherini and Jyrki Katainen, “Wir sollten die 
EU zu echter Verteidigungsunion entwickeln”, Die Welt, 27 
January 2017, https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/ 
article161587224/Wir-sollten-die-EU-zu-echter-Verteidigungs-
union-entwickeln.html (accessed 30 May 2017). 
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Currently there is a clear legal separation between 
the defence union and the security union. The initia-
tive for a security union is predominantly driven by 
the Commission and focuses mainly on new issues in 
internal and judicial policy, but also aims to interlink 
internal and external security. By contrast, the defence 
union is a political project proposed by foreign and 
defence ministers. Cybersecurity and migration policy 
cut through this formal separation. In Europe’s multi-
level governance, they are an interface between major 
projects in internal and external security as well in 
domestic, foreign and defence policy. The EU plans 
to develop more resilience to terrorist attacks, illegal 
migration, changes in cyberspace and hybrid threats. 
To do so, it will rely on the Comprehensive Approach – 
meaning the coherent use of military, civilian and 
economic instruments – as well as a tighter interlock-
ing of internal and external security. In August 2016, 
the Weimar Triangle states (France, Germany and 
Poland) even suggested creating an independent 
format of the European Council to deal exclusively 
with issues of internal and external security.57 
Since the summer of 2016, France and Germany 
have been calling for closer cooperation not just in 
defence policy, but also in internal security.58 Both 
states advocate a “multi-speed Europe” to deepen the 
security and defence union. They are prepared to pro-
ceed in small groups and want to rely more heavily 
than before on enhanced cooperation (TEU art 20 
para 1), Permanent Structured Cooperation (TEU 
art 42 para 6 and art 46) and constructive abstentions 
(TEU art 31). European security is already organised 
differently by region and function. Not all member 
states are formerly involved in policy on internal secu-
rity or in defence policy. The UK, Ireland and Denmark 
use opt-out clauses for internal and judicial policy. 
Moreover, Denmark does not participate in the com-
mon decision-making processes of the CSDP. Nor are 
all EU member states members of NATO: Finland, 
Ireland, Malta, Sweden, Cyprus and Austria are not. 
 
57 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Jean-Marc Ayrault and Witold 
Waszczykowski, Gemeinsame Erklärung der Außenminister des Wei-
marer Dreiecks zur Zukunft Europas, 28 August 2016, http://www. 
auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2016/ 
160828_Gemeinsame_Erkl%C3%A4rung_Weimarer_Dreieck. 
html (accessed 14 June 2017). 
58 Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Jean-Marc Ayrault, Ein star-
kes Europa in einer unsicheren Welt, (Berlin, 2016), https://www. 
auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/736264/ 
publicationFile/217587/160624-BM-AM-FRA-DL.pdf (accessed 
10 August 2017). 
The security and defence union is characterised 
by variable geometry in judicial and domestic policy, 
security and defence policy, and EU-NATO coopera-
tion. Some initiatives exist, to bind together this vari-
able geometry: in late June 2017, the European Coun-
cil for the first time signalled its readiness to rely on 
Permanent Structured Cooperation under the CSDP, 
for instance to realise the new civilian-military EU 
headquarters (MCCP). 
The Security Union 
The security union is based on the concept of the “area 
of freedom, security and justice”. It was implemented 
via the Tampere (1999–2004),59 The Hague (2005–
2009)60 and Stockholm programmes (2010–2015).61 
The relevant Treaty provision is article 3 paragraph 2 
of the TEU. However, the current Commission pro-
gramme and restructuring go further still. From the 
outset, the Commission’s goal was to interweave in-
ternal and external security and domestic and foreign 
policy. In April 2015, after the attacks on the French 
satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, the Commission 
presented the European Agenda on Security.62 The 
Commission regards organised crime, terrorism and 
cybercriminality as cross-border challenges and a 
shared European task, and therefore as justification 
for deepening European cooperation within the frame-
work of a European security agenda.63 A year later, 
in response to the terror attacks in Brussels in March 
2016, the Commission announced that it would be 
setting up a security union. Its main legal basis was to 
be article 67 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
 
59 European Council, Tampere, Conclusions of the Presidency, 
15–16 October 1999. 
60 European Commission, “The Hague Programme: Ten Pri-
orities for the Next Five Years – The Partnership for European 
Renewal in the Field of Freedom, Security and Justice” (Brus-
sels, 10 May 2005), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ 
TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0184&from=de (accessed 14 
June 2017). 
61 EU Council, “The Stockholm Programme – An Open and 
Secure Europe Serving and Protecting the Citizens”, 17024/09 
(Brussels, 2 December 2009), http://register.consilium.europa. 
eu/doc/srv?l=DE&f=ST%2017024%202009%20INIT (accessed 
14 June 2017). 
62 European Commission, “The European Agenda on Secu-
rity”, COM(2015) 185 final (Strasbourg, 28 April 2015), https:// 
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/ 
documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_ 
de.pdf (accessed 14 June 2017). 
63 Ibid. 
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European Union (TFEU), subject to article 4 paragraph 
2 of the TEU and article 72 of the TFEU, in which the 
EU creates an “area of freedom, security and justice”, 
also known as the Schengen Area. Commissioner 
Julian King, newly appointed in September 2016, was 
entrusted with implementing the “Schengen secu-
rity”. His task will be to bring about an interlocking of 
internal and external security. He has set himself the 
following priorities: a) improving the legal framework 
for counter-terrorism, b) prevention and de-radicalisa-
tion, c) improving the exchange of information be-
tween member-state authorities, d) setting up data 
banks and their interoperability, e) border controls, 
and f) better protection for critical infrastructure. 
By September 2017, nine progress reports had been 
submitted for implementation. Among other things, 
a counter-terrorism centre has been established at 
Europol, gun laws have been tightened, and a counter-
terrorism directive have been adopted. A data-protec-
tion directive for electronic communications (the 
ePrivacy directive) is under way. Police authorities in 
Europe increasingly rely on data from various sources 
in their analyses and investigations.64 This means that 
they handle vast amounts of data and use them foren-
sically across borders. Europol will have to play an 
ever greater part in transmitting personal data in 
the future. To date, it has concluded agreements on 
operational cooperation with the USA, Canada, Nor-
way, Switzerland and Australia. IT management will 
inevitably have to be pooled at both the national and 
the EU level. The seventh report on implementing the 
security union, published in mid-May 2017, explains 
the Commission’s goal of bringing about the inter-
operability of IT systems in the areas of security, 
border management and migration management by 
2020. It is intended to ensure that border-control and 
law-enforcement officials – including customs officers 
and employees of immigration and judicial authori-
ties – have the necessary information at their disposal. 
The European Commission also checks whether US In-
ternet groups adhere to the agreed codex on deleting 
hate speech, and how the digital economy in general 
deals with illegal content. A need for more regulation 
along the lines of Germany’s Internet Enforcement Law 
(Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz) is imminent. All four areas 
of the security union – from counter-terrorism via or-
ganised crime and cybersecurity to the exchange of 
 
64 Compare the critical perspective in Jorrit Rijpma and 
Mathias Vermeulen, “EUROSUR: Saving Lives or Building 
Borders?”, European Security 24, no. 3 (2015): 454–72. 
information – show a high degree of overlap between 
internal and external security. This also explains the 
growing approval of Europe-wide cooperation on secu-
rity, as well as the inter-institutional and political 
merger of legally distinct security and defense projects 
at the EU level. 
The Defence Union 
The security and defence union currently enjoys broad 
approval, even in the European Parliament. This is a 
novelty. In its November 2016 report on future mili-
tary cooperation within the EU, the European Parlia-
ment called for any newly created defence union to 
enable the interlocking of national armies and to 
transform the battlegroups, which have existed since 
2009 but never been deployed, into standing units.65 
Member states are also expected to cooperate more in-
tensively in arms procurement, of which about 80 per 
cent is currently still carried out using purely national 
markets. According to the Commission, the cost of this 
practice is up to 100 billion euros annually.66 During 
Commission President Juncker’s State of the Union 
address in September 2016, he exhorted member 
states to coordinate their defence efforts more closely.67 
In late November 2016, the Commission submitted the 
European Defence Action Plan (EDAP).68 The objectives 
it expresses go far beyond the civilian-military Head-
line Goals determined in 2008. Among other things, 
the Plan calls for sufficient capacity-building to carry 
out ten civilian and five military operations simulta-
neously. The European Council of December 2013 
surely paved the way by agreeing four key projects 
in which member states were to pool capacities and 
establish common use with support from the Euro-
pean Defence Agency (EDA): in-flight refuelling, 
 
65 European Parliament, Draft Resolution of the European Par-
liament on the Implementation of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, 2016/2036(INI) (30 November 2016). 
66 European Commission, Fact Sheet The European Defence Action 
Plan – FAQs, MEMO/16/4101 (Brussels, 30 November 2016), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4101_en.htm 
(accessed 14 June 2017). 
67 Jean-Claude Juncker, “Towards a Better Europe – A Europe 
that Protects, Empowers and Defends”, State of the Union 
Address, 14 September 2016, https://publications.europa.eu/ 
en/publication-detail/-/publication/c9ff4ff6-9a81-11e6-9bca-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-30945725 
(accessed 29 June 2017). 
68 European Commission, European Defence Action Plan, 
COM(2016) 950 final (Brussels, 30 November 2016). 
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remote-controlled aviation systems, national satellite 
communications and cyberdefence. The conclusions of 
the June 2015 European Council made these projects 
the subject of a strategic guideline on developing the 
CSDP. In June 2017, an agreement was reached, inter 
alia, on establishing a European Military Planning and 
Conduct Capacity (MPCC).69 The previously primarily 
political declarations of member states have become 
more legally binding – in contrast to earlier initiatives. 
Additionally, Commission President Juncker for-
warded a clear time-table in September 2017, setting 
2025 as the deadline for creating a “fully-fledged 
European Defence Union”.70 
In late June 2017, the Commission proposed the 
creation of a European Defence Fund to enable pooled 
investment in research and development.71 The Fund 
is intended to promote joint research into defence 
technologies, such as electronics, metamaterials, 
encrypted software and robot technology. The Com-
mission has earmarked 25 million euros for 2017, but 
projects that that figure may rise to 90 million euros 
per annum by 2020. The EU’s post-2020 Multiannual 
Financial Framework is envisaged to contain a defence 
research programme worth around 500 million euros 
a year. It is also expected to facilitate joint military 
procurement, for example of encrypted software or 
helicopters, generating annual savings of about five 
billion euros. To that end, the Commission intends 
to support the European structural and investment 
funds and the European Investment Bank (EIB) in 
financing the development of dual-use goods and tech-
nologies. Moreover, the general guidelines on awarding 
public contracts are to be extended to the defence and 
security sector so as to boost cross-border cooperation 
and drive the development of common industrial 
norms. 
There is increasing focus on certain aspects of dual 
use, if from a new angle. A series of European Defence 
Agency (EDA) projects currently address the issue of 
how research results might be used not just for mili-
tary and civilian ends, but also for internal and ex-
 
69 See also Rosa Beckmann and Ronja Kempin, EU Defence 
Policy Needs Strategy: Time for Political Examination of the CSDP’s 
Reform Objectives, SWP Comments 34/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2017). 
70 Jean-Claude Juncker, “State of the Union Address 2017” 
(Brussels, 13 September 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm (accessed 28 September 
2017). 
71 Beckmann and Kempin, EU Defence Policy Needs Strategy 
(see note 69). 
ternal security. The first two contracts have been 
awarded to research into unmanned aviation systems 
and mobile reconnaissance robots for urban warfare. 
A third consortium received a commission to develop 
an autonomous surveillance platform for both exter-
nal and internal security. The project aims to connect 
autonomous reconnaissance systems – for instance 
drones and sensors – into a swarm (EuroSWARM) by 
using lasers and jammers and put it under central 
command. The EDA sees possible applications primarily 
in border control and surveillance security. 
EU-NATO Cooperation 
European security is no longer merely built around 
better networking of internal and external security; it 
has also become an area of substantial activity within 
NATO.72 Under a framework agreement dating from 
March 2003, the Berlin Plus Agreement, the EU is 
authorised to draw on NATO assets and capabilities for 
its military operations.73 The two organisations’ joint 
declarations of July and December 2016 also reflect 
the central theme of the Global Strategy, which is that 
the EU’s territory can only be effectively defended 
if the EU and NATO cooperate closely.74 Commission 
President Juncker emphasised the importance of this 
cooperation when, in September 2017, he called the 
defence union an explicit wish of NATO.75 
During the NATO summit in Warsaw in early July 
2016, the defence ministers of the EU member states 
that participate in the framework-nation concept de-
cided to open up the cooperation initiative to partner 
states and existing multinational institutions – includ-
ing the EDA. The new clause also authorises coopera-
 
72 Markus Kaim, Reforming NATO’s Partnerships, SWP Research 
Paper 1/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Janu-
ary 2017). 
73 Berlin Plus Agreement, 17 March 2003, http://www. 
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin 
%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf (accessed 30 May 2017). 
74 Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the 
President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, STATEMENT/16/2459 
(Brussels, 8 July 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ 
STATEMENT-16-2459_de.htm (accessed 14 June 2017); “State-
ment on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration Signed 
by the President of the European Council, the President of 
the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, Press Release (2016) 
178 (Brussels, 6 December 2016), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natohq/official_texts_138829.htm (accessed 14 June 2017). 
75 Juncker, “State of the Union Address 2017” (see note 70). 
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tion with EU states that are not NATO members. This 
time Cyprus did not veto EU-NATO cooperation, whose 
objective is to correct deficits. Only six months after 
the NATO summit in Warsaw, 42 measures had been 
agreed to accelerate the agreed intensification of 
cooperation in seven fields of action. They include 
defence against hybrid threats, early warning and 
situational awareness, parallel operations in identical 
areas, cybersecurity and cyber-defence, interoperable 
capabilities, defence industry and research as well 
as exercises to reinforce the resilience of the EU and 
NATO partners. Most member states are in favour of 
the close coordination of NATO and EU armed forces 
in these areas. All measures in foreign, security and 
defence policy should automatically also strengthen 
NATO or at least complement its range of tasks.76 
Here are just two examples: First, both the EU and 
NATO are pursuing the stabilisation objective. As 
decided at the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, their 
respective measures should complement and com-
plete each other. Second, the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) has established an analytical 
unit for hybrid threats, the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell. Its 
task is to pool information from security authorities 
in NATO and EU states, EU institutions and partner 
states.77 The June 2017 European Council also con-
firmed that a European Centre of Excellence for 
Countering Hybrid Threats was to be set up in Helsin-
ki. Based on this, the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell will be in 
charge of early warning and situational awareness for 
protecting against hybrid threats, such as cyber-attacks. 
NATO and EU also cooperate when training the de-
fense against cyber attacks. NATO General-Secretary 
Jens Stoltenberg, for example, was invited to the 
“EU Cybrid 2017” wargame, while officials from EU 
member states will be invited to the NATO exercise 
“CMX 17”.78 
 
76 The authors of this collective work argue likewise: Forward 
Resilience: Protecting Society in an Interconnected World, ed. Daniel 
S. Hamilton (Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 2016). 
77 European Commission, “Joint Framework on Countering 
Hybrid Threats”, JOIN(2016) 18 final (Brussels, 6 April 2016). 
78 Radio Free Europe, “EU Defense Ministers Hold Cyberwar 
Game in Tallinn“, 7 September 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/ 
eu-defense-ministers-cyberwar-game-tallinn/28721870.html 
(accessed 28 September 2017); European External Action Ser-
vice, Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of 
Proposals Endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016, 
14 June 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/170614-
joint-progress-report-eu-nato-en-1.pdf (accessed 28 September 
2017). 
Another fact in favour of EU cooperation with NATO 
is that the CSDP is exclusively orientated towards ex-
ternal threats, not intended for territorial defence and 
legally precluded from being deployed inside the EU. 
For NATO as a defensive alliance, national defence is 
obviously a central task. 
Cybersecurity 
Cyber-attacks on states and critical infrastructure have 
been a reality for a long time.79 Their quantity and qual-
ity is constantly growing. Even the border between 
offensive and defensive orientation is blurred. Wher-
ever an actor has defensive capabilities, that actor can 
also attack. The difficulty in unequivocally attributing 
attacks to a perpetrator shows that, in political, tech-
nical and legal terms, cyberspace is de facto border-
less. Cyberspace and information space know neither 
national borders nor an institutional structure. Juris-
diction over cybersecurity policy is shared between 
member states and the EU. In August 2016, the direc-
tive on “measures for a high common level of security 
of network and information systems across the Union” 
(NIS directive) came into effect.80 It creates a uniform 
European legal framework for making national capac-
ities in cybersecurity available EU-wide, facilitating 
more cooperation between member states, and formu-
lating minimum security standards and reporting 
obligations for specific services that protect critical 
infrastructure. In order to draft the corresponding 
measures, two new coordinating mechanisms are 
being set up. One will support member states’ stra-
tegic cooperation and exchange of information; the 
other, the network of Cyber Security Incident Re-
sponse Teams (CSIRT), will be responsible for emer-
gency assistance in situ. 
Cybersecurity policy in the EU is based not only on 
the NIS directive but also on the 2013 Cyber Security 
Strategy81 and the 2015 Strategy for a Digital Single 
 
79 Annegret Bendiek, European Cyber Security Policy, SWP 
Research Paper 13/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, October 2012). 
80 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level 
of security of network and information systems across the Union, 
L 194/1 (Brussels, 6 July 2016), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.194.01.0001.01.ENG& 
toc=OJ:L:2016:194:TOC (accessed 14 June 2017). 
81 European Commission, Cybersecurity Strategy of the European 
Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, JOIN(2013) 1 final 
(Brussels, 7 February 2013), http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/ 
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Market.82 It also builds on the most recent announce-
ments regarding the implementation of the 2015 Euro-
pean Agenda on Security and on protecting against 
hybrid threats from 2016. Institutionally, cybersecurity 
is viewed as a cross-sectional task for the Council; it 
is tackled by the Horizontal Working Party on Cyber 
Issues. Even during crises, cybersecurity is located at the 
interface of civilian and military cooperation as well 
as internal and external security. Should a substantial 
cyber incident occur, a great number of EU institutions 
are henceforth called on to cooperate.83 The 2013 
Cybersecurity Strategy as well as its reform package 
from September 2017 aim to manage cybersecurity 
across policy areas.84 This includes building resilience, 
fighting cybercrime, building cyberdefence, develop-
ing industrial and technical resources and elaborating 
a diplomatic strategy for cyberspace. However, whilst 
European cooperation in fighting cybercrime has 
already scored its first victories in the shape of success-
ful Europol investigations, cyber-foreign policy and 
cybersecurity policy remain a matter of well-meant 
declarations of intent. The Commission has therefore 
encouraged the member states to include cyber-
defence in PESCO and the defence fund. 
In its Cyber Defence Policy Framework of November 
2014, the EU urged its member states to check their 
cyber-defence capabilities for the CDSP and fulfil their 
obligations to the Alliance.85 The EU’s Military Staff 
has also demanded better protection against cyber-
attacks on EU-led operations and missions. Cybersecu-
rity and cyber-defence cooperation between the EU 
and NATO has been intensified since 2015, formalised 
in the July 2016 Warsaw Declaration, and reinforced 
with concrete implementation proposals at the joint 
 
docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf (accessed 
14 June 2017). 
82 A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, COM(2015) 192 
final (Brussels, 6 May 2015), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0192 (accessed 14 
June 2017). 
83 They include the European Union Agency for Network 
and Information Security (ENISA), the EU’s IT emergency 
team (CERT-EU), the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) 
located within Europol, the EU judicial authority Eurojust, 
the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, the EU Intelligence and Situation 
Centre (INTCEN) of the EEAS, and the EDA. 
84 European Commission, “State of the Union 2017 – Cyber-
security: Commission scales up EU’s response to cyber-attacks”, 
Press release (Brussels, 19 September 2017). 
85 EU Council, EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, 15585/14 
(Brussels, 18 November 2014), https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/ 
files/documents/EU-141118-EUCyberDefencePolicyFrame.pdf 
(accessed 14 June 2017). 
meeting of the EU and NATO foreign ministers in 
December 2016.86 In November 2016, the European 
Parliament explicitly advocated deepening coopera-
tion on cyber-defence.87 It called on member states to 
build up the necessary capabilities with the support 
of the EDA and NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). The EDA is tasked with 
creating synergies between the capability development 
of the EU and NATO. Projects for cyber-defence include 
the Collaboration Database (CoDaBa) and Capability De-
velopment Plan (CDP). Cooperative EU-NATO projects 
include early-warning capabilities for headquarters 
and a multi-agent system for Advanced Persistent 
Threat detection (MASFAD). 
The current revision of the European Cyber Security 
Strategy will have to consider all of these initiatives in 
internal and external security as well as the develop-
ments in data security in the digital single market.88 
This is moving in the right direction since the CFSP, 
EEAS and the High Representative for Foreign and 
Security Policy all designate Europe as the level at 
which member states’ security and defence is to be 
built up. The reforms of the EU Cyber Security Strategy 
will also have to develop the role of the EEAS and of 
civilian instruments of cyber-diplomacy – in other 
words, confidence and security-building measures – 
just as much as the 2016 Cyber Policy Tool Box. This 
EU catalogue of sanctions enables it to impose politi-
cal, financial and legal counter-measures to respond 
appropriately to cyber-attacks that remain under the 
legally defined threshold of an armed conflict. In 
the past few years, progress has certainly been made 
in cybersecurity, especially in technical attribution, 
issues of international law, and confidence-building 
measures in the United Nations’ Group of Governmen-
tal Experts (GGE), the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the G20. 
The Commission and High Representative further 
plan a European Competence Centre, which is to 
 
86 Bruno Lété and Daiga Dege, NATO Cybersecurity: A Roadmap 
to Resilience, Policy Brief 3, 2017 (Washington: The German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, July 2017). 
87 European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 23 
November 2016 on the Implementation of the Common Security and 
Defence Policy, 2016/2067(INI) (Strasbourg, 23 November 2016), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP// 
TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-0440+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=GA 
(accessed 14 June 2017). 
88 Annegret Bendiek, Due Diligence in Cyberspace: Guidelines for 
Germany’s International Cyber Policy and Cyber-Security Policy, SWP 
Research Paper 7/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, May 2016). 
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develop instruments and technologies for internal and 
external cyberdefence from 2018 onwards. Additionally, 
an agency for cybersecurity is to bundle competences 
on cyber-defence and resilience-building in the areas 
of network and information security. It will build 
upon the European Agency for Network- and Infor-
mation Security, ENISA. Nevertheless, far too much 
critical national infrastructure is still protected na-
tionally or privately. To incentivise cooperation, the 
Commission and High Representative plan a cyber-
security emergency fund as well as an EU framework 
for cyber and other crisis management exercises. 
Both hope that this legislative package will introduce 
a wide array of internal and external measures to 
strengthen European cybersecurity. The exchange 
of information on cyber-risks is inadequate not only 
between the EU and its member states, but also be-
tween the European agencies Europol, Eurojust, EDA 
and ENISA. The responsible Directorates-General only 
cooperate partially and often do not receive the neces-
sary information from member states to be able to 
create a Europe-wide security net. 
Migration 
The migration crisis has made it obvious that there is 
almost no solidarity between EU member states. Since 
the European Commission proposed its Agenda on 
Migration in May 2015, it has passed 34 legislative acts 
to try and find a European response to the migration 
crisis.89 All member states agree that in the long term, 
the only solution is to improve living conditions in 
countries of origin. To this end, Commission and mem-
ber states have agreed a “New European Consensus 
on Development”.90 In the short and medium term, a 
European response to the refugee crisis is to consist 
 
89 European Commission, European Agenda on Migration – 
Legislative Documents, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ 
what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-
implementation-package_en (accessed 10 August 2017). 
90 European Parliament, Council and European Commis-
sion, “The New European Consensus on Development. ‘Our 
World, our Dignity, our Future’”, Official Journal of the European 
Union C 210 (30 June 2017), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:2017:210:TOC (accessed 15 Sep-
tember 2017). On the criticism from NGOs such as Oxfam, 
see Matthew Tempest, “‘New Consensus’ on Development 
Adopted – and Immediately Condemned”, Euractiv, 19 May 
2017, http://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/ 
news/new-consensus-on-development-adopted-and-
immediately-con demned/ (accessed 15 September 2017). 
of improved external border controls as well as more 
effective and improved cooperation with countries 
of transit. Additionally, a Europe-wide quota solution 
or even immigration policy is envisaged. However, 
this will not be possible until member states put aside 
their national egotisms or, if need be, until the ECJ 
urges them to cooperate (chapter 2.1).91 
Since September 2015, EU countries including 
Germany, Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, and Macedonia 
have reacted to migration flows at their own discre-
tion and without agreement with the neighbouring 
states concerned.92 They have closed their borders par-
tially or entirely and thus shifted the problem to their 
nearest neighbour to the southeast. Border-control 
and asylum authorities were so ill-equipped to cope 
with the situation that EU Commissioner Dimitris 
Avramopoulos was forced to propose deploying an EU 
border-protection force. The resettlement of 160,000 
refugees from Greece and Italy, decided in 2015, has 
also failed resoundingly: only a few tens of thousands 
were accommodated in other EU countries. The Euro-
pean Commission has used a supplementary budget 
to cobble together an emergency package for member 
states that were particularly badly affected by the refu-
gee crisis. Greece and Italy will only be able to tackle 
the additional immigration adequately if Turkey and 
the North African states, which have been categorised 
as safe countries of origin, cooperate closely with the 
EU.93 Turkey will accept the return of all Syrian refu-
gees who have illegally entered Greece if, in return, 
the EU takes up to 72,000 registered Syrian refugees 
off Turkey’s hands.94 The idea is to fight illegal migra-
tion by converting it into legal migration. Since the 
EU-Turkey summit in mid-March 2016, the EU’s refu-
gee policy has also been in Libya’s hands: the closure 
 
91 ECJ verdict of 26 July 2017 on the right to asylum. 
92 See also Annegret Bendiek and Jürgen Neyer, Europäische 
Solidarität. Die Flüchtlingskrise als Realitätstest, SWP-Aktuell 20/ 
2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2017). 
93 The EU has developed three dialogue formats for this: the 
Rabat Dialogue, the Khartoum Dialogue and the Interconti-
nental Dialogue. All three are funded by the Africa-EU Dia-
logue on Migration and Mobility (MMD). 
94 On the problematic nature of the EU-Turkey deal, see 
Günther Seufert, Turkey as Partner of the EU in the Refugee Crisis. 
Ankara’s Problems and Interests, SWP Comments 1/2016 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2016). Since the 
attempted coup in July 2016, the Turkish government under 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been behaving in increas-
ingly authoritarian ways. Maintaining rule-of-law standards is 
a precondition for visa-free travel for Turkish citizens as well 
as for EU accession talks, which were halted in December 2016. 
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of the Balkans route has shifted refugee routes to 
Europe to the southern Mediterranean. Italy has con-
cluded a comparable bilateral agreement with Libya 
on combating illegal immigration and human traffick-
ing.95 Libya, due to its political instability, is turning 
out to be particularly problematic. At the Malta Sum-
mit in early February 2017, the EU heads of state and 
government decided to reinforce Libya’s border guard 
to enable it to intercept more migrants and take them 
to reception camps in Libya, where they will be per-
suaded to return home.96 
The EU is utilising three main CFSP activities – 
the EU Border Assistance Mission Libya (EUBAM Libya), 
Planning and Liaison Cell (EUPLC) and Operation 
EUNAVFOR MED – to go on the offensive in foreign 
and security policy as well.97 At the European Coun-
cil’s special meeting on migration in April 2015, the 
heads of state and government had already decided on 
CSDP measures.98 They include adapting the mandates 
of EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUTM Mali, as well as EUCAP 
Sahel Mali. From July 2016 onwards, those missions 
were integrated into Migration Partnership Frame-
work of the EU’s migration policy. By summer 2017, 
the Commission initiated so-called Project Cells and 
Regional Coordination Cells respectively for all CSDP 
missions in the Sahel zone, in order to support the five 
Sahel states in the areas of security, border manage-
ment, and defence.99 Migration and border manage-
ment in the Mediterranean serves as an example of 
how external and internal EU policies are to inter-
twine: Frontex, Europol and Eurojust cooperate with 
Sophia, EUBAM Libya and the NATO mission in the 
Mediterranean. 
 
95 See also Raphael Bossong, Zwänge und Spielräume für eine 
europäische Grenz- und Flüchtlingspolitik, SWP-Aktuell 38/2017 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2017). 
96 The aid organisation Médecins sans Frontières is not alone 
in pointing out that detaining people in Libya or remitting 
them to their home country is contrary to the EU’s principles 
of human dignity and rule of law: Ärzte ohne Grenzen, 
“Statement zu EU-Plänen gegen Flüchtende im Mittelmeer”, 
26 January 2017, https://www.aerzte-ohne-grenzen.de/libyen-
mittelmeer-eu-schutzlinie-fluechtlinge (accessed 29 June 
2017). 
97 Restricted Document Outlines Official Proposals and 
Recommendations for Future EU Actions in Libya, in State-
watch, July 2017. 
98 For a critical perspective on this approach, see Mattia 
Toaldo, Don’t Close Borders, Manage Them: How to Improve EU 
Policy on Migration through Libya (London: European Council 
on Foreign Relations [ECFR], 15 June 2017). 
99 Pietz, “Flexibilisierung und Stabilisierungsaktionen” 
(see note 21). 
In May 2015, the EU foreign and defence ministers 
established EUNAVFOR MED, the European Union 
Naval Force – Mediterranean, dubbed Sophia. The June 
2015 operational plan provides for reconnaissance 
and intelligence gathering to improve situational 
awareness of smuggler networks. All information ob-
tained by the force will be gathered at headquarters 
and put at the disposal of the member states’ law-
enforcement authorities. Since October 2015, it has 
been authorised to take action on the high seas against 
boats being used by people smugglers. In September 
2016, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
decided to launch a further support task. Operation 
Sophia is also intended to help prevent illegal arms 
transports in the operational area in accordance with 
UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) and later, 
in particular Resolution 2292 (2016) on the arms em-
bargo against Libya. Sophia is mandated by a Security 
Council Resolution under chapter 7 of the UN Charter 
to “maintain or restore international peace and secu-
rity”. The use of military resources even outside inter-
national waters, for instance in Libyan territorial 
waters, is thus authorised. 
Concurrently, in late February 2016, NATO set out 
the modalities of maritime surveillance in the Aegean 
Sea. The Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG 2), 
which is currently under German command and also 
consists of ships from Greece, Canada and Turkey, 
is monitoring the Aegean Sea and establishing situa-
tional awareness of trafficking. The goal is to make a 
joint contribution to combating people trafficking 
and illegal migration in light of the refugee crisis. It is 
based on a proposal by Greece, Germany and Turkey 
that was adopted by NATO at its defence ministers’ 
meeting in mid-February 2016. NATO makes available 
the data gathered during its maritime surveillance to 
Frontex and the Greek and Turkish coastguards. At its 
Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO also decided to 
launch mission Sea Guardian, whose goal is to control 
the Mediterranean more effectively and contain the 
activities of the terrorist islamist organisation IS. In 
exceptional cases, it will also be allowed to search 
boats of suspected supporters of terrorist groups. Mis-
sion Sea Guardian replaces the NATO-led Operation 
Active Endeavour, which was launched after the 
attacks of 11 September 2001 and ended on 15 July 
2016. NATO’s mission in the Mediterranean, Sea 
Guardian, and the EU mission Sophia are intended to 
complement each other. Since, NATO has also been 
sending ships and aircraft to the Mediterranean to 
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provide location information and logistical support to 
the EU marine mission Sophia. 
The “military crisis-management measures” agreed 
by the EU and NATO since 2015 to combat people 
smuggling and trafficking networks – as well as the 
EU’s enhanced cooperation with the AU and other 
countries of origin and transit in Africa – suggest that 
the EU’s central strategic objective is not to transform 
the source states or fight the causes of migration, but 
rather to defend against threats. Critics such as Steven 
Blockmanns from the Brussels think tank CEPS even 
consider Operation Sophia and the “development of 
a semi-military European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency” to be military actions by the EU to combat 
migration.100 In Bosnia-Herzegovina and off the coast 
of Somalia, there are currently comparable military 
deployments within the CSDP framework. Above all, 
however, it is the anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of 
Aden, Mission Atalanta, that critics see as an impor-
tant model for Sophia and “maritime security” in 
general. Additionally, the EU relies on the so-called 
technical and material upgrading of partners. These 
military measures are currently financed inter alia 
by the foreign-policy stability instrument, and in 
future also by development cooperation funds.101 
Border protection, migration policy and counter-
terrorism have become fields of action for the CFSP/ 
CSDP. This does not remove them from ECJ oversight 
if EU citizens bring lawsuits against the corresponding 
EU laws. Even citizens of third states can sue for their 
rights by appealing to the European Court of Human 
Rights. The separation between the CFSP and the legal 
community should thus become increasingly mean-
ingless. Moreover, the ECJ will have to verify more 
closely in future whether the agreed CFSP measures 
on combating piracy, human trafficking and illegal 
migration and the restrictive measures should have 
been implemented on the basis of the treaty principles 
of the “area of freedom, security and justice” (TFEU 
art 75).102 This same question also arises for the 
 
100 Timon Mürer, Die neue Grenzschutz-Agentur – ein Fortschritt 
für die EU? (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 16 September 2016), 
https://www.fes.de/de/themenportal-flucht-migration-
integration/artikelseite-flucht-migration-integration/die-neue-
grenzschutz-agentur-ein-fortschritt-fuer-die-eu/ (accessed 
10 August 2017). 
101 Nikokaj Nielson, “EU Development Aid to Finance 
Armies in Africa”, EUobserver, 5 July 2016. 
102 Maise Cremona, Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. Im-
proving Functioning of the EU: Foreign Affairs (Brussels: Policy 
Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 
European Parliament, 2016). 
deployment of the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency in Serbia.103 Other issues that must be 
addressed are what legal framework covers the 
training of security forces in Libya and how migration 
management can be harmonised with human 
rights.104 
The Legal Community and the Role of the ECJ 
The EU “is a legal community in its external actions as 
well”105 because its authorities are subject to oversight 
under EU law even when they act at the international 
level. The furthest reach of its jurisdiction is consid-
ered to be the assertion of the integrity and autonomy 
of EU law not just vis-à-vis member states, but also vis-
à-vis international law.106 EU courts do not recognise a 
categorical distinction between “inside” and “outside”. 
The precondition for the existence of the legal com-
munity is that the judicial paradigm is valid as a mat-
ter of principle. Whether a measure forms part of ex-
ternal actions or “internal policies” (TFEU, third part) 
makes no difference in terms of legal supervision. The 
ECJ plays a central role in implementing efforts to 
build up a legal resilience that has at its core the objec-
tive to “provide a European legal space” to “cooperative-
ly conceive and realise a common order in Europe”.107 
A resilient EU is emerging from the legal commu-
nity. The role of the ECJ is essential for the EU’s resili-
ence, which gets its bearings from the concept of the 
rule of law, the principle of legality, judicial control 
and the protection of individual rights.108 A resilient 
 
103 Council of the EU, Status Agreement between the EU and the 
Republic of Serbia on Actions Carried out by the European Border 
and Coast Guard Agency on the Territory of the Republic of Serbia 
(Brussels, 19 May 2017).  
104 “Europas Armutszeugnis. Die EU ist in der Flüchtlings-
politik nicht nur zerstritten”, Frankfurter Rundschau, 19 July 
2017. Recommended reading on this subject is the legal clas-
sification by Daniel Thym, “Migrationssteuerung mit den 
Menschenrechten”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 August 
2017. 
105 Matthias Kottmann, Introvertierte Rechtsgemeinschaft. Zur 
richterlichen Kontrolle des auswärtigen Handelns der EU (Heidelberg, 
2014), 3. The seminal text is Walter Hallstein, Die Europäische 
Gemeinschaft, 5th edition (Düsseldorf and Vienna, 1979), 53. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Armin von Bogdandy, “Raum der Hoffnung”, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 April 2017; Armin von Bogdandy, “Euro-
pean Law Beyond ‘Ever Closer Union’. Repositioning the Con-
cept, Its Thrust and the ECJ’s Comparative Methodology”, 
European Law Journal 22, no. 4 (2016): 519–38. 
108 Kottmann, Introvertierte Rechtsgemeinschaft (see note 105), 79. 
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legal community defends itself against all actors and 
actions that undermine it. According to constitutional 
judge Andreas Vosskuhle, it is not possible to preserve 
the values on which the EU is based and achieve its 
objectives within an alliance of 28 member states with 
vastly different historical, cultural, social and economic 
characteristics without adhering to self-imposed 
rules.109 The law, he asserts, offers substance, helps 
to avoid or solve conflicts, and creates legitimacy by 
assigning decision-making powers and providing 
decision-making procedures. However, only certain 
actors are involved in making the idea of the legal 
community a reality in the EU’s external actions: the 
member-state governments that negotiate and develop 
European treaties; the Council, which in some cases 
enacts secondary legislation with the Commission; 
the agencies that deal with the application and imple-
mentation of decisions; the EP and national parlia-
ments; and, last but not least, private actors, who 
can participate in various ways, for instance through 
associations or lobby initiatives. Simultaneously, the 
Commission and ECJ have restricted possibilities for 
supranational action under the CFSP.110 
Under article 275 of the TEU, the ECJ has only 
limited competence for the CFSP. As defined in the 
treaties (TEU art 19 para 1, TFEU art 263), the ECJ 
assesses the political authorities’ actions against the 
legal order. It thus has the same structural relation-
ship to the EU’s external actions as national courts do 
towards their governments’ foreign policies.111 Despite 
having been coined internationally, the expression 
“integration through law”112 is a very German con-
cept, which meets its limits especially in the CFSP. The 
CFSP cannot be imposed on member states by a cen-
tral court decision. However, the Lisbon Treaty and 
the ECJ’s administration of justice have argued that 
the EU authorities are not exempt from court over-
sight even during EU external actions where these 
occur in constellations relevant to legal protection. 
The ECJ has emphasised that “the review by the Court 
 
109 Andreas Vosskuhle, “‘Integration durch Recht’ – Der 
Beitrag des Bundesverfassungsgerichts”, Audimax Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin, 22 October 2015. 
110 Riddervold, “(Not) in the Hands of the Member States” 
(see note 12); Marianne Riddervold and Guri Rosén, “Trick 
and Treat: How the Commission and the European Parlia-
ment Exert Influence in EU Foreign and Security Policies”, 
Journal of European Integration 38, no. 6 (2016): 687–702. 
111 Kottmann, Introvertierte Rechtsgemeinschaft (see note 104). 
112 Coined by Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe and 
Joseph H. Weiler, Integration through Law (Berlin, 1986). 
of the validity of any Community measure in the light 
of fundamental rights must be considered to be the 
expression, in a community based on the rule of law, 
of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EC 
Treaty as an autonomous legal system which is not 
to be prejudiced by an international agreement”.113 
The extension of the EU legal community to the 
CFSP occurs both in Commission lawsuits against in-
dividual member states and in proceedings by non-
state legal entities against allegedly unlawful practices 
by member states or EU institutions.114 The following 
ECJ verdicts are important junctures cementing 
the European legal community in the EU’s external 
actions:115 
Sanctions against Russia: In response to Russia’s actions 
destabilising Ukraine, the Council in July 2014 adopted 
a resolution and regulation on restrictive measures 
that limited a variety of money transactions, the ex-
port of certain sensitive goods and technologies, the 
access of specific Russian organisations to capital mar-
kets, and performing specific services in the oil sec-
tor.116 The aim was to raise the costs of Russia’s actions 
against Ukrainian sovereignty. One of the Russian 
companies targeted by the measures is Rosneft, which 
specialises in petroleum and natural gas. Rosneft 
launched a lawsuit against the restrictions on its 
operations. The ECJ dismissed its claim, arguing that 
the political interests of the EU must take priority over 
the market freedoms of non-EU legal entities. It thus 
expressed its political willingness to back both the 
sanctions regime imposed by the Council and the re-
silience of the EU against third parties. It also supports 
the powers of the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The ECJ rejected 
Rosneft’s argument that rights could be derived from 
 
113 ECJ, 3 September 2008, Case C-402/05 P, Kadi, I-6351, 
para 316, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= 
CELEX%3A62005CJ0402. 
114 The ECJ is responsible for preliminary decisions on the 
legality or otherwise of restrictive measures that have been 
enacted under the CFSP vis-à-vis natural or legal persons. 
Graham Butler, “A Question of Jurisdiction: Art. 267 TFEU 
Preliminary References of a CFSP Nature”, European Papers 
(2017): 1–8. 
115 Christina Eckes, “The CFSP and Other EU Policies. A Dif-
ference in Nature?”, European Foreign Affairs Review 20, no. 4 
(2015): 535–52; Christina Eckes, “Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy. The Consequences of the Court’s Extended Juris-
diction”, European Law Journal 22, no. 4 (2016): 492–518. 
116 ECJ, 28 March 2017, C-72/15, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
liste.jsf?num=C-72/15. 
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the EU-Russia partnership and cooperation agreement 
which were contrary to, and took priority over, the EU 
sanctions regime. 
Defence market: The ECJ is also very important in 
promoting a common European defence market and 
thus improving the EU’s defensive capabilities. Along-
side directive 2009/43/EC issued by the European Par-
liament and the Council on 6 May 2009 on simplifying 
transfers of defence-related products within the EU, 
directive 2009/81/EC aimed to make a contribution to 
creating a European market for defence products and 
strengthening Europe’s base in arms technology and 
industries.117 As a matter of principle, defence con-
tracts were no longer to be awarded using the excep-
tion clause of article 346 of the TFEU, i.e. outside of 
the framework provided by the internal-market regu-
lations. By August 2011, three member states were able 
to demonstrate complete implementation of the direc-
tive; a fourth did so in September 2011. The Commis-
sion initiated infringement proceedings under article 
258 of the TFEU against 23 member states, by serving 
them with formal notices. By March 2012 a further 
15 member states had informed the Commission that 
they had fully implemented the directive. The Com-
mission continued infringement proceedings against 
the remaining eight member states. By June 2012, two 
had implemented the directive fully, another two only 
partially. The objective of the Commission’s current 
proposals to create a European defence market is 
to make implementation of directives 2009/43 and 
2009/81 legally binding, so as to ultimately reduce 
market dependency on third parties. 
Migration: The ongoing infringement proceedings 
against Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland are 
significant in emphasising European resilience. The 
Commission accuses the three states of violating EU 
law by refusing to participate in the distribution of 
refugees among EU member states. The legal proceed-
ings are of central importance for the consistency of 
EU policy and thus a precondition for agreements 
with third parties. In September 2015 the EU states 
took a majority decision to distribute 160,000 of the 
migrants that had arrived in Italy and Greece amongst 
themselves. Using a quota system, the refugees were 
 
117 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on Transposition of Directive 
2009/81/EC on Defence and Security Procurement, COM(2012) 565 
final (2 December 2012). 
meant to be transferred to other member states by 
September 2017. However, to date only around 21,000 
have been resettled in the EU. Several eastern Euro-
pean countries still refuse to do their share under this 
legally binding decision. Hungary and Slovakia have 
brought lawsuits before the ECJ in Luxembourg against 
the obligation to receive refugees. Poland and Hun-
gary have so far not accepted a single person. The 
Czech Republic did let 12 asylum seekers from Greece 
enter the country, but it has not taken in any further 
refugees from the resettlement programme for a year. 
In mid-June 2017, the Commission therefore launched 
infringement proceedings against the three countries, 
which can result in fines. Slovakia recently accepted 
a small number of refugees, the only one of the four 
Visegrád countries to have done so. It is therefore cur-
rently not facing similar proceedings. Austria was 
granted an exception until March 2017 because of its 
own high numbers of refugees. However, it has since 
agreed to accept asylum seekers according to the 
quota system. 
The ECJ is also an important actor in defending 
individual rights against member-state violations. 
Immediately prior to the special meeting on refugee 
policy in September 2015, the European Commission 
launched 40 infringement proceedings against 19 EU 
countries. It accused them of not having adequately 
implemented existing European law on asylum. This 
encompasses regulations on granting refugee status, 
minimum standards for asylum proceedings and re-
ception conditions for applicants. Alongside Germany, 
the proceedings concerned France, Italy, Austria, 
Spain, the Netherlands and Hungary, among others. 
Two weeks before the Council meeting, Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker had already announced 
his intention to launch infringement proceedings 
against states that had not implemented the decisions 
of the common asylum policy. These include in par-
ticular Directive 2013/32/EU,118 which sets out com-
mon procedures for “granting and withdrawing inter-
national protection”, and Directive 2013/33/EU, which 
determines the “standards for the reception of appli-
cants for international protection”.119 The contents of 
 
118 European Union, Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Common Procedures for 
Granting and Withdrawing International Protection http://eur-lex. 
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0060: 
0095:EN:PDF (accessed 29 June 2017). 
119 European Union, Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 26 June 2013 Laying Down Standards for 
the Reception of Applicants for International Protection http://eur-
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both laws resolve a great number of legal issues and 
obligations concerning the reception of refugees. The 
threat of legal action ensured that most states were 
cooperative. 
Sanctions: The ECJ’s decisions show that the law is a 
stable instrument of integration for the CFSP as well. 
When imposing sanctions, legal minimum standards 
must be met vis-à-vis the affected EU citizens.120 Some 
listed citizens have already taken legal action against 
their inclusion in sanctions, and in some cases have 
had their inclusion annulled. On 3 September 2008, the 
ECJ made a landmark decision in its Kadi and Al Bara-
kaat cases: not only can autonomous EU sanctions be 
reviewed by the EU judiciary, but so can UN sanctions 
which have had no separate material-legal review by 
the EU. The ECJ declared the resolution applying the 
UN Resolution to the plaintiffs null and void because 
it breached the minimum standards set by the rule of 
law (especially the right to be heard by a court and to 
adequate legal protection). After the immediate adop-
tion of a resolution that satisfied the requirements of 
effective legal protection and a hearing before a court, 
the EU procedure for accepting UN lists had to be 
adapted. 
Concurrently, the sanctions committee of the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) began to bring its listing pro-
cedure closer in line with the rule of law under Reso-
lution 1822 (2008).121 Following an ECJ decision of 
30 September 2010, the renewed inclusion in an EU 
sanctions list of a person listed by the UNSC on sus-
picion of financing terrorism is invalid (Kadi II deci-
sion).122 The ECJ objects to this type of listing decision 
because, by definition, it fails the EU’s minimum legal 
requirements. When the person concerned appeals, 
a listings decision has to be reviewed thoroughly, and 
evidence must be disclosed. The ECJ confirmed its 
verdict on 18 July 2013. For the EU, legal protection 
 
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180: 
0096:0116:en:PDF (accessed 29 June 2017). 
120 Eckes, “The CFSP and Other EU Policies. A Difference in 
Nature?” (see note 115); Eckes, “Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy. The Consequences of the Court’s Extended Juris-
diction” (see note 115). 
121 United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1822 
(2008), 30 June 2008, https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/s/res/ 
1822-%282008%29 (accessed 29 June 2017). 
122 ECJ, Judgment of the General Court, 30 September 2010 – 
T-85/09, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? 
text=&docid=83733&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req& 
dir=&occ=first&part=1 (accessed 29 June 2017). 
takes precedence over the implementation of UN sanc-
tions in accordance with international law. 
Data protection and data security: A key area of Europe’s 
resilience to data misuse is the building up of effective 
instruments for ensuring data protection and data 
security. The personal data of European Internet users 
are inadequately protected against access by authori-
ties in the US – so said an ECJ decision from early Octo-
ber 2015 (C-362/14).123 A lawsuit was also brought by 
the Austrian Max Schrems who considered his Face-
book data to be insufficiently protected from state sur-
veillance in the USA.124 This invalidated the Commis-
sion’s so-called Safe Harbour Agreement on data pro-
tection in the USA. The Irish data-protection author-
ities were able to prohibit the transfer of European 
facebook data to servers in the US. The Commission 
was forced to negotiate a new agreement with the 
USA, known as Privacy Shield. Its Facebook decision 
is the ECJ’s third recent decision that develops data 
protection and security in Europe. The ECJ made its 
first decision in April 2014 on the EU’s data-retention 
directive,125 its second in May 2014 against Google and 
for the “right to be forgotten”. The decision on data 
retention called for minimum standards in data secu-
rity and data protection, and gave momentum to the 
implementation of the directive as part of the 2013 EU 
Strategy on Cybersecurity (see chapter 2.4).126 In July 
2017, the ECJ invalidated the EU’s planned Passenger 
 
123 Annegret Bendiek, “Am Ende werden die Gerichte ent-
scheiden”, Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 8, no. 3 
(2015): 335–45 (335); Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, 
“The Transatlantic Data War”, Foreign Affairs 95, no. 1 (2016): 
124–33. 
124 Paul De Hert/Pedro Cristobal Bocos, Case of Roman Zakho-
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Schrems Judgment, 23 December 2016, https://strasbourg-
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strasbourg-follow-up-to-the-luxembourg-courts-schrems-
judgment/ (accessed 29 June 2017). 
125 In December 2016 the ECJ decided that member states 
could not impose a general obligation to store data on the 
providers of electronic communications services: Judgment 
of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016 in the 
joined cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, 21 December 2016; 
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Das jüngste Urteil des EuGH vom 21.12.2016, 7 January 2017, 
https://community.beck.de/2017/01/07/neues-in-sachen-
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21122016 (accessed 29 June 2017). 
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tive on the Protection of Personal Data in Cyberspace: Ex-
plaining How the European Union is Redefining Borders”, 
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Name Records Agreement with Canada for violating 
EU citizens’ basic rights. This is the first time that 
the most senior judges have rejected an international 
agreement with reference to the basic rights set out in 
the EU charter. This expert assessment should have an 
impact on other EU agreements, for instance with the 
USA or Australia, but is also likely to influence the in-
ternal EU directive on flight passenger data. 
CSDP missions: The EU’s military operations are prov-
ing the growing importance of protecting individuals’ 
rights in the domain of the CFSP/CSDP. Under article 
43 paragraph 1 of the TEU, CFSP/CSDP missions can 
encompass common disarmament measures as much 
as combat missions as part of crisis management, 
including peace-restoring measures and stabilising 
operations after conflicts. Because EU military mis-
sions draw on member states’ troops and because of 
the EU’s international legal status under article 47 of 
the TEU, questions are increasingly being raised over 
its responsibility and the possibilities for legal pro-
tection against military actions during those missions. 
Article 7 of DARIO (Draft Articles on the Responsibility 
of International Organisations) stipulates that in cases 
of organs being placed at the disposal of an inter-
national organisation the latter is liable as long as it 
exercises “effective control” over the organ’s ac-
tions.127 Shielding external actions from the principles 
of the rule of law, as desired by EU governments, is 
thus invalid. The Court drew on the DARIO decision as 
a benchmark for attribution in the key decision on 
Behrami and Saramati, so as to pronounce itself on 
the attribution of actions by KFOR troops on the EU 
mission in Kosovo. A decision by the European Court 
of Human Rights further sets out that deployed per-
sonnel are always accountable for their own human-
rights violations. In 2012, the ECHR made clear in its 
ground-breaking Hirsi decision that human rights also 
apply on the high seas. As soon as refugees are on a 
European ship, they are under the effective control of 
the respective state. That state must provide access to 
 
127 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Respon-
sibility of International Organizations – DARIO, Art. 7: “The con-
duct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an inter-
national organization that is placed at the disposal of another 
international organization shall be considered under inter-
national law an act of the latter organization if the organiza-
tion exercises effective control over that conduct.” Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission (2011), vol. II, Part Two, 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/
9_11_2011.pdf (accessed 23 August 2017). 
asylum procedures. In the Hirsi case, the ECHR only 
had to decide about a specific push-back operation 
from Italy to Libya. Such operations aim to push back 
third country nationals who lack residence permits, 
before they might reach EU waters. However, the 
instructions from its decision apply to remittances to 
all African transit states in which refugees are at risk 
of receiving debasing or inhuman treatment or even 
torture. A remittance to such states is a violation of 
article 3 of the European Human Rights Conven-
tion.128 Current CFSP missions are strongly connected 
to border protection and migration and are thus also 
directly relevant for the protection of individual rights. 
This will likely be a significant future area for ECJ deci-
sions pertaining to resilience. 
These court decisions all make very clear that not 
only the EU’s external actions, but also the CFSP, are 
increasingly subject to legal standardisation by the 
ECJ. The old separation between the legal community 
and external politics is increasingly ineffective and 
almost impossible to sustain.129 Simultaneously, it is 
obvious that the resilience of the European legal com-
munity to member-state violations of the acquis is not 
limited to the single market, but is increasingly being 
transferred by the ECJ to the domain of foreign and 
security policy as well. 
The Outlook for Reform 
The resilience paradigm shakes up past logics of CFSP 
integration and action. The idea of democratic trans-
formation of the European neighbourhood and the 
goal of perpetual integration of all member states are 
gradually sidelined. Instead, the EU focuses on build-
ing resilience against external threats and develops 
new flexible modes of cooperation of increased inte-
gration – including third states. At the same time, the 
EU is quite willing to further integrate single policy 
 
128 European Court for Human Rights, Grand Chamber Case 
of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (Application no. 27765/09) Judg-
ment. This Version was Rectified on 16 November 2016 under Rule 81 
of the Rules of Court. Strasbourg, 23 February 2012, https://www. 
proasyl.de/news/internationales-recht-eu-muss-bootsfluecht-
linge-retten-und-aufnehmen/ (accessed 10 August 2017). 
129 See the similar assessment in Thomas Giegerich, “Wege 
zu einer vertieften Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheits-
politik: Reparatur von Defiziten als ‘kleine Lösung’”, in Die 
Europäische Union am Scheideweg: mehr oder weniger Europa?, ed. 
Stefan Kadelbach (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), 135–82 (146). 
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areas with only a limited number of member states, 
if no all-encompassing consensus can be found. 
The security and defence union builds on three 
major fields: the security union, defence union and 
EU-NATO cooperation. It aims to increase the resili-
ence of the EU to external and internal risks and chal-
lenges. It may vary by region and function, but it 
concentrates power in the CFSP. In the emerging new 
security and defence union, such classic domestic-
policy domains as cybersecurity or migration policy 
become fields of action for the CFSP. As the fields of 
action for foreign and security policy expand, the CFSP 
is simultaneously opening up to the ECJ’s juridifica-
tion. The distinction between juridified domestic/judi-
cial policy and “political” foreign/security policy is 
being weakened or even demolished entirely in key 
domains such as counter-terrorism, the fight against 
organised crime and cybersecurity. 
This has certain consequences for the EU’s self-
image as an international actor: 
1. It is difficult to overlook the fact that the “Europe 
of security” and the concept of resilience have a tense 
relationship with the idea of multilateralism, and 
especially the idea of “effective multilateralism” as 
embedded in the previous European Security Strategy 
(ESS) of 2003. Security interpreted as resilience goes 
hand in hand with dismantling vulnerability and thus 
aims to lower interdependence, especially in the EU’s 
relations with third states. In other words: since inter-
dependence – from the realistic perspective of inter-
national relations – must always also be understood as 
mutual vulnerability, the objective of reducing vulner-
ability inevitably also implies reducing interdepend-
ence. A multilateral world order, on the other hand, 
is founded on the idea of global public goods and the 
necessity of cooperating on the basis of reciprocal 
dependence. It is therefore highly controversial whether 
or not the resilience paradigm contradicts the very 
idea of a multilateral order. 
2. If the security and defence union actually devel-
ops into a new key element of the integration process, 
it will be accompanied by a tendency to shift the EU’s 
normative emphasis from the cosmopolitan ideal 
of the integrated market to an integration project 
aiming at protectionism and European sovereignty. A 
Europe of security and defence could allow the return 
of old modes of confrontation, security dilemmas and 
the arms race. The EU’s goal of “strategic autonomy” 
is a lofty and at first sight attractive ideal. However, it 
also contradicts the idea of a convergent and inter-
dependent world in which conflicts cannot be solved 
unilaterally (“with strategic autonomy”) – for instance 
through maximum deterrence – but by using dialogue 
and cooperation. The terminology must therefore be 
explicated, especially as regards technological sover-
eignty between the EU and NATO. Fundamentally, the 
idea of strategic autonomy does not complement but 
rather competes with the objective of interweaving 
the European and American pillars of Western secu-
rity policy. The aim of Europe’s foreign and security 
policy should therefore not be “strategic autonomy” 
but “strategic intertwining”, particularly with a view 
to the UK’s and US’s commitment to the European 
security order. 
3. Resilience is closely related to terms such as “self-
assertion”, “military empowerment of third countries”, 
“digital sovereignty” or “externalising migration”. Here, 
the EU relinquishes its transformative ideal in its ex-
ternal actions towards third states and restricts it to 
those elements which are significant for resilience, 
in the sense of preserving the stability of the politi-
cal order as a community of shared laws and values. 
Although this does not mean that the EU will stop 
supporting human rights and the rule of law in third 
states, it does mean a reprioritisation. The EU’s new 
leitmotif – “a safe and secure Europe” – was embedded 
in the Rome Declaration of March 2017, which articu-
lated a marked prioritisation of European interests in 
an environment that is increasingly, to use N. Tocci’s 
words, “complex, contested and conflictive”. Every sov-
ereign unit strives to be resilient, not least since that 
eases cooperation. However not all societies, not even 
within the EU, are willing to subsume themselves to a 
legal dimension of resilience, which the “Masters of 
the Treaties” once set for the EU’s external actions 
through its treaties. 
4. In June 2017, the EU decided to rely more on 
forms of flexible integration. These include foremost, 
in the CSDP, the Permanent Structured Cooperation 
and, in the CFSP, enhanced cooperation and construc-
tive abstentions. They make it possible to overcome 
the decades-old blockade of foreign and security-policy 
integration and bring about a Europe of security and 
defence. The process is driven by an extension of the 
Berlin-Paris axis to Rome and the increasingly close 
cooperation between the three member states, pre-
ferably with members of the Eurozone. The political 
plan is to keep the creation of a security and defence 
union inclusive and open to all EU member states as 
well as close partners, such as the UK and US. Within 
the EU however, Qualified Majority Voting must be 
applied, an advance which was explicitly supported 
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by Commission President Juncker in 2017, but which 
continues to fail in the political reality. If the ECJ con-
tinues to play an active role in permeating Europe’s 
external actions with European legislation, then this 
condensing of the EU’s ability to act should in the 
foreseeable future also translate into an increase in 
power at the supranational level. The ECJ’s stance 
towards member states would then gain in impor-
tance in the CFSP. Similarly, the High Representative 
and the EEAS would likely be held much more ac-
countable by the national parliaments and the EP. 
An important lever would be an inter-institutional 
agreement between the High Representative and the 
EP, ensuring that EP requests are promptly processed 
and considered. 
In the short term, these challenges should be 
tackled in a European White Book on security and 
defence; in the medium term, through treaty changes. 
Emmanuel Macron suggested a strategy for Europe’s 
defense and security just a few days after the German 
election in late September. The EU’s Global Strategy 
(EUGS) of July 2016 is still a non-binding document. 
Therefore, a European White Book on security and 
defence would clarify the substantive reorientation of 
the EUGS and, in technical terms, transform it into an 
“endorsed” and therefore legally binding document 
that would have to be accepted by the national parlia-
ments. European policy should be honest, so that the 
discrepancy between the CFSP’s public representation 
(as normative power) and its actual orientation to-
wards a new “Europe of security” does not endanger 
its public support or its democratic and strategic 
credibility. 
A European White book process on security and 
defence should start by defining the stance of resili-
ence towards multilateralism and transformative 
ambitions. The strength of the European Foreign and 
Security Policy lies both in its affirmation of multi-
lateralism and in its recognition that Europe’s past 
can be instructive for its own value system, which it 
has advocated since the end of World War II. Ironically, 
some of the global norms and institutions that have 
been carefully constructed in the last two decades to 
repudiate the idea of sovereignty as impunity – in-
cluding the responsibility to protect, and the Inter-
national Criminal Court – are increasingly challenged. 
Moreover, the EU principles of flexible integration and 
“strategic autonomy” have an uneasy relationship, to 
say the least; their contents need to be fleshed out in 
a way that goes beyond the conceptual terminology 
of principled pragmatism. Security may increasingly 
depend on political stability in other countries. Yet 
foreign and defence policy should not automatically 
act in what traditionally used to be the province of 
economic and domestic policy. Only then will the full 
spectrum of “resilience” become visible, one that goes 
far beyond issues of upgrading measures, technologi-
cal sovereignty and externalising forced displacement 
and migration in third states. The EU’s June 2016 Glo-
bal Strategy on foreign and security policy thus leaves 
the possibility of an inclusive process to create a Euro-
pean White Book on security and defence. In the 
medium term, the UK’s exit from the EU also creates 
a window of opportunity for EU treaty reforms, which 
could be used to bring about the necessary changes 
in primary legislation. 
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Abbreviations 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
AU African Union 
CCDCOE Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 
NATO 
CDP Capability Development Plan 
CERT-EU European Union Computer Emergency Response 
Team 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CFSP-IPK Interparliamentary Conference for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy 
CoDaBa Collaboration Database 
CODUN EU Council Working Group on global disarmament 
and arms control 
COHOM EU Council Working Group on human rights 
COJUR EU Council Working Group on international law 
CONOP EU Council Working Group on general affairs 
CORAM EU Council Working Group on conventional arms 
control 
COSAC Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union 
Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union 
COTER EU Council Working Group on terrorism 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy 
CSIRT Computer Security Incident Response Team 
DARIO Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organisations 
EC European Community 
EC European Council 
EC3 European Cybercrime Centre 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECFR European Council on Foreign Relations 
ECHR European Court of Human Rights 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
EDA European Defence Agency 
EDAP European Defence Action Plan 
EDF European Development Fund 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EIB European Investment Bank 
ENISA EU Agency for Network and Information Security 
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy 
EP European Parliament 
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy 
ESS European Security Strategy 
EU European Union 
EUBAM Libya    EU Border Assistance Mission Libya 
EUCAP EU Capacity Building Mission 
EUGS EU Global Strategy 
EUNAVFOR MED    European Naval Force – Mediterranean 
EUPLC EU Planning and Liaison Cell 
G7 Group of 7 
G8 Group of 8 
G20 Group of 20 
GGE Group of Governmental Experts 
HR High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy 
ICC International Criminal Court 
INTCEN EU Intelligence and Situation Centre 
IS “Islamic State” 
MASFAD Early warning capabilities for headquarters and 
multi-agent system for Advanced Persistent Threat 
detection 
MPCC Military Planning and Conduct Capability 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NIS Network and Information Systems 
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PSC Political and Security Committee 
SC Security Council 
SNMG 2 Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UN United Nations 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
ZIF Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (Centre 
for International Peace Operations) 
